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INTRODUCTION
Demands for citizens’ "civil rights" has been a recurrent theme 
of contemporary society for nearly twenty years; however, it has not
been until the -last— tive-dfliat^^the -rights. .of-American Indians - have^been^ 
£accorded-great-attentiij->n. Perhaps because of the romantic character­
istics attributed to them by our fixation on the grand development of 
the nation, the rights of the Indian have become a challenge to the 
integrity of the United States,
The story of the development of the country is the story of ac­
quisition of Indian lands, and this paper is a discussion of the ele­
ments and activities of the two outstanding contributors to the history 
of United States-Indian relations— the Congress of the United States, 
and the Supreme Court. The questions of primary responsibility and the 
content of policy will be discussed through chapters on the status of 
treaties, acquisition of title to lands, regulatory actions of Congress, 
and the Indian Claims Commission, In each chapter, significant opin­
ions of the Supreme Court determining responsibility and policy will 
be considered.
1
CHAPTER I
THE STATUS OF TREATIES IN 
INTERNATIONAL AND AMERICAN LAW
Introduction
Treaties perform the same functions in international law that con­
stitutions, legislation and contracts do within a sovereign nation. They 
have the authority of law, but are distinguished by a singular dependence 
on the good faith of the parties for enforcement.^ In the absence of fac­
tors which contribute to enforcement within one nation, such as a unified 
political culture and standardized procedure for managing infractions of 
legal agreements, "good faith" is at best an ambiguous standard which 
varies with the ability of each party to maintain its authority to com- 
mit itself and its strength to enforce terms of the commitment.
Thus, though the state might have the capacity to enter into 
agreements with other states because of its inherent sover­
eignty, it might not have, by its Constitution, the ability 
to perform the obligations incurred. [Emphasis supplied.]^
The crisis in American Indian policy was preordained by the nature 
of the parties— two highly dissimilar systems of law and culture. The 
sole outstanding similarity was the consciousness each party had of it­
self as a sovereign nation. However, the sovereignty of one was not
James McLeod Hendry, Treaties and Federal Constitutions (Washington, 
D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1955), pp. iii-4.
2Ibid., p. 39.
3Ibid., p. 96.
2
3mutually recognized by the other, "sovereignty'1 itself was not identi­
cally defined, and the title of one "sovereign" tribe to property was 
not necessarily acknowledged by any other "sovereign" tribe. In this 
disagreement over sovereignty lies the nemesis of the treaty as a tool 
of conducting Indian relations. It forces us to acknowledge the appli­
cability of Toynbee’s statement that the only sanction to performance of 
the terms of a treaty is coercion by the stronger power.^
Each tribe regarded land as a tribal inheritance enjoyed in unquali­
fied ownership. The United States regarded land, by reason of the right 
of discovery, as owned by the Federal government, and acknowledged only 
the tribes’ use of such land at the grace of the government. It was ex­
tremely rare for Englishmen or Americans to support the tribal contention.
By the end of the Nineteenth Century, the recognition of tribes as 
nationalities having capacity to execute treaties with the United States 
was characterized as "a legal fiction" created solely out of necessity”* 
by the demands of humanity and pure pragmatism without which "the lordly 
savage [would] forbid the wilderness to blossom like the rose . . . ."^
^Fred L. Israel, ed., Major Peace Treaties of Modern History 1648- 
1967, with an Introduction by Arnold Toynbee (New York: Chelsea House 
Publishers, 1967), I, xxvii.
^Monroe E. Price, Law and the American Indian, Readings, Notes and 
Cases (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1973), p. 372, citing 
Indian Land Cessions in the United States, 18 United States Bureau of 
Ethnology, Pt. 2, pp. 535-555, passim.
^Price, American Indian, p. 373, citing Indian Land Cessions (Oration 
of John Quincy Adams, December 22, 1802).
4While it is understandable that Nineteenth Century attitudes would 
disqualify tribes as nations in the absence of the standard accoutrements 
of European civilization, not all tribes were inadequate in that respect. 
Written constitutions probably originated in the Fifteenth Century with 
the Iroquois Confederacy. The Constitution of the Five Nations provided 
for specific procedural and substantive requirements, including the rule 
of unanimity, a federal structure, provisions for initiative, referendum 
and recall, and male suffrage.^ Though the majority of tribes operated 
under an unwritten code, those which acquired written forms provided ser­
vices which we would consider municipal functions: land management, the 
identification of Indians as members of a distinct tribe with heads of
g
state, and judicial determination of illegal actions.
Regardless of these characteristics of an organized society and in 
the presence of overwhelming dissimilarities, treaty making with Indian 
tribes was a method of acquiring title on paper to land gained by con­
quest. Treaties were negotiated and executed because English law demanded 
compliance with established legal procedure. Their purpose was to achieve
settlement of title disputes pursuant to a European system.
This chapter will examine four elements of treaty making with Indian 
tribes: (i) America's inheritance from England, (ii) constitutional status
^Felix S. Cohen, "How Long Will Indian Constitutions Last?" in The 
Legal Conscience, Selected Papers of Felix S. Cohen, ed. by Lucy Kramer
Cohen (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960), p. 222.
^Ibid., pp. 224-28.
5of treaties, (iii) standard elements in some actual treaties, and (iv) 
the philosophical position of the Supreme Court in its early years. 
America’s Inheritance from England
International law accepts the doctrine that the law of a prior sov­
ereign is maintained until actively changed by the new sovereign, and 
that the nationality of the source is of no special consequence. The 
United States, therefore, was fundamentally an heir of British and Span­
ish principles of law and obviously the British influence had greater 
9impact.
The first significant British interest in the position of the In­
dians in the colonies was expressed in a report of the Lords of Trade 
read before the Council at the Court of St. James on November 23, 1761.
. . .the primary cause of that discontent . . . was the
Cruelty and Injustice with which they had been treated with 
respect to their hunting grounds, in open violation of those 
solemn compacts by which they had yielded to use the Domin­
ion, but not the property of those lands.-*-®
The statement's significance lies in the enunciation of an assumed sover­
eignty ("Dominion") of the Crown though the land was maintained by the 
tribes.
The acknowledgment that injustices occurred in violation of agree­
ments with the tribes was simply an expression of regret since Britain
^Felix S. Cohen, "The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of 
the United States," ibid., p. 248.
lOprice, American Indian, p. 376, citing Indian Land Cessions.
generally ignored the legal status of Indians when making grants and 
charters. Such contracts were made with English subjects and retained 
sovereignty in the Crown. The Plymouth Charter, for example, included 
a provision that "the grant is not to include any lands ’actually pos­
sessed or inhabited by any other Christian prince or state,’ but the
1 1Indians are wholly ignored." Realistically, the religious status re­
ferred to would indicate that other European claims, even if not held 
to be absolute, would be granted serious appraisal, while Indian claims 
to title were inconceivable.
An exception to the common absence of mention of tribes is found in 
the Maryland Charter. While their occupancy of part of the land was ac­
knowledged and nominal compensation (two arrows) required to take the 
land, the colonists were directed to consider tribes as enemies, and the
grant authorized the Governor to wage war against them for the purpose
12of "vanquish[ing]11 them.
The general characteristics of Britain’s Indian policy were, there­
fore, the sovereignty of the Crown over all territorial claims, an acknow­
ledgment of the occupancy by Indians of parts of the claimed land and a 
legal requirement that compensation be paid for the taking of land from 
tribes. However, the state, being supreme, had the right to simply "van­
quish" the tribes.
1:LIbid. , p. 375.
12Ibid., p. 376.
7Spanish law, expressed primarily by the Roman Catholic Church, 
amplified the definition of the right of the discoverer by the stipu­
lation that discovery did not give a right to confiscation of posses­
sions, nor did religion or lack thereof have any bearing on rights to 
land.13
The United States expressed acceptance of the basic British and 
Spanish principles in its establishment of sovereignty over the conti­
nent. In the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, it expressed "good faith" 
toward Indians and guaranteed them possession of land and property unless 
they consented otherwise,"*-^  and in Article VI of the Treaty of April 30, 
1803 for the cession of Louisiana from France it guaranteed property 
rights of the inhabitants of the Louisiana Territory:
Art. VI. The United States promise to execute such trea­
ties and articles as may have been agreed between Spain 
and the tribes and nations of Indians, until by mutual 
consent of the United States and the said tribes or na­
tions, other suitable articles shall have been agreed 
upon.
Constitutional Status of Treaties
An administrative system to execute America’s philosophy of sover­
eignty over Indian lands was established by constitutional provisions for 
treaty making and management of United States-tribal relations. The power
l% e l i x  S. Cohen, "Indian Claims," in Legal Conscience, p. 268-69. 
l^Cohen, "Spanish Origin," ibid., p. 242.
l^Felix S. Cohen, "Original Indian Title," in Legal Conscience, 
p. 280, n. 16.
8to make treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate, as well as 
general conduct of foreign relations, is granted to the Executive by 
Article II, Section 2. However, since Indian tribes were not regarded 
strictly as foreign nations, the Constitution grants to Congress in 
Article I, Section 8 the responsibility for dealing with tribes. Arti­
cle I, Section 10 forbids treaty-making by states, guaranteeing Federal 
control over the matter.
In actual practice, the United States adheres to the monistic
theory of treaties— if validly made they become law without further 
16
action. However, there are several elements which complicate the 
process. Neither the President nor Congress is prohibited from qualify­
ing, ignoring or revoking a treaty at any time.^ Congress may, for
example, invalidate a previously ratified treaty by legislation incon-
18sistent with its terms. And the activities of the Foreign Relations
Committee and of individual Senators as representatives of the United
States during informal negotiations may have significant impact on the 
19
treaty process. Finally, enforcement of treaties may be impeded when 
1 f \The opposing dualistic theory is followed in Canada where trea­
ties must be embodied in a statute. (Hendry, Treaties, p. 14.)
■^Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution (Mineola, New 
York: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1972), p. 133, citing U.S. v. Curtiss- 
Wright Corporation, 299 U.S. 304 (1936); U.S. v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 
(1937); U.S. v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. 
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
■^Hendry, Treaties, p. 91.
-^Henkin, Foreign Affairs, p. 131.
the legislative branch and/or individual states are obligated to perform 
20some function, thereby expanding the scope of negotiation into other 
political arenas and decreasing the likelihood of completing good faith 
agreements in a timely fashion.
The judicial responsibility is based upon provisions in Article 
VI, Section 2 providing that treaties, the Constitution and laws are the 
supreme law of the land, and in Article II, Section 2 extending the judi­
cial power thereto.
The judiciary may stipulate proper subjects of international nego- 
21
tiation, but typically removes itself from consideration of the provi­
sions of actual treaties. For example, whether the courts have the power
to declare the terms of a treaty void and unenforceable has not been clari- 
22fied, nor has the judicial acceptability of a treaty requiring passage 
of some legislative program affecting the United States.^3
The judicial responsibility arises in treaty performance, "to ascer­
tain whether the treaty-making authority has acted constitutionally when 
it allegedly infringed some right of a subject . . . [J]udicial interference
^Hendry, Treaties, p. 7.
^ I b i d ., p. 72, citing Degeogroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890).
^ Ibid. , p. 91, citing U. S. v. Reid, 73 Fed. (2nd) (U.S.) 153, p. 155. 
23
Ibid., citing Bacardi Corps of America v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150 
(1940); Fujii v. California 217 Pacific 2nd (U.S.) 481; (Calif. Appeals, 
1950) overruled by (1952) 242 Pacific 2nd (U.S.) 617; 38 Calif. 2nd 718.
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in the treaty process cannot arise until after a fait accompli." [Em-
24phasis supplied.J
Since the power of the Court to declare the terms of a treaty void
and unenforceable is doubtful, courts have adhered consistently to a
policy of "judicial self-abnegation." Treaties are normally regarded
as political questions inappropriate for adjudication and best left to
the executive and legislative realms. However, if private rights are
allegedly violated, the court’s duty is to pass on the constitutionality
of the treaty involved. The most effective challenges are based on in-
25fringements of preferred freedoms. However, no treaty has been found 
unconstitutional by any American court and few have been seriously chal-
i j 26lenged.
There are some exceptions to the court’s abnegation; for example,
9 7
where a procedural question arises, where "doubtful expressions" are to 
28be resolved, where the amount of compensation is questioned, and where 
24
Hendry, Treaties, p. 67.
2 5Henkin, Foreign Affairs, p. 137.
)  f iHendry, Treaties, p. 72, citing In re Cooper, Ware v. Hylton,
U. S. v. Reid, U. S. v. Thompson.
7 7Price, American Indian, pp. 419-20, citing U. S. v. Santa Fe Pacific 
R. Co., in which the Court determined whether Congress had in fact authorized 
extinguishment of title.
^ Ibid. , citing Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912)
11
Congress has specifically given the court jurisdiction in a particular
29claim.
These exceptions are the fundamental standards of jurisprudence 
regarding Indian property rights, and have served as consistent stan­
dards for equitable relief of tribal grievances and management of In­
dian affairs. Generally, the position of the Supreme Court has been 
to support both the body of law inherited from England, principally the 
right of the discoverer with necessity of compensation, and the consti­
tutional grant of authority to Congress. Its position is both the source 
and remedy of conflict. Since the action of the legislative branch is 
final as long as it conforms to procedural requirements and fairness, 
treaties can be overriden by act of Congress. While the Court can re­
lieve a particular complaint, it does not have the power to direct the 
Congressional management of the treaty process.
29 Ibid. In addition, the Department of State is a source of gui­
dance to the judiciary in rendering its determination of whether the case 
involves a political question. Hendry, Treaties, p. 72.
"An indication by the Dept, of State to the judiciary that it 
is an impolitic or embarassing agreement, and a subsequent de­
termination that the treaty is not self-executing would be a 
possible way for the executive to repudiate such an obligation.
Such a method would be a breach of international law, however, 
as the treaty is internationally valid on constitutional con­
clusion." Hendry, Treaties, p. 103, n. 29. "For a determina­
tion of the question of self-executing and non-self-executing 
treaties see Marshall's opinion in Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 233, 
314 (U. S. 1829)." Hendry, Treaties, p. 10.
Standard Elements in Treaties
The geographical expansion of the colonists demanded a government
policy toward orderly acquisition of Indian land. The need was fulfilled
by the passage of the Act of July 22, 1790 requiring a treaty to validate
transfers of Indian land to the United States, and a special act of Con-
30gress for the sale of tribal land. With the end of the War of 1812 
American pioneers considered the move westward with less anxiety and pro­
mulgated the pretense of Indian tribes as independent nations in order
31to effectuate the treaty-making policy. Between 1789 and 1850 alone
245 treaties were concluded for the purchase of 450 million acres of land
32at $.20 per acre. At the height of the great crossing of the Plains, 
Indian Commissioners were established by executive order to negotiate 
treaties with reluctant tribes, and though negotiations were completed ac­
quisition of property was only determined by successful military expeditions 
Certainly an element which illustrated the inappropriateness of the 
treaty method was the incompatability of language. Although tribal repre-
30Cohen, "Spanish Origin," Legal Conscience, p. 236. However, if lands 
had been individualized under conditions of ownership for a certain period 
of time, usually 25 years, or with the approval of the Secretary of the In­
terior, a special act was not needed.
31 Israel, Major Peace Treaties, with a Commentary by Emanuel Chill,
II, 664.
37Notes, "Systematic Discrimination in the Indian Claims Commission: 
The Burden of Proof in Redressing Historical Wrongs," Iowa Law Review, Vol. 
No. 5 (June, 1972), p. 1302.
-^Israel, Major Peace Treaties, p. 665.
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sentatives signed various documents, the meaning of the elaborate legal
34
provisions eluded them. Generally, the parties declared perpetual 
peace and friendship and promised each other assistance in just wars and 
service as a source of information on the activities of other hostiles.
A system of trade was established and both parties agreed not to punish 
citizens of the other.
More detailed terms had great impact on the control and ownership 
of lands and demanded a clear and precise understanding of legal obliga­
tions, which may or may not have been present, and which most certainly 
were violated by both parties.
Under the Delaware Indian Treaty of September 17, 1778, the tribe 
agreed to give free passage to American troops and to provide food and 
supplies to them upon compensation. The United States stipulated that 
if other tribes should join the agreement, the Delawares would become 
the chieftains of all and have representation in Congress, and guaranteed 
"all their territoreal [sic] rights in the fullest and most ample manner,
as it hath been bounded by former treaties, as long as they . . . shall
35
abide by, and hold fast the chain of friendship now entered into."
The Treaty of Fort Greenville of August 3, 1795 clarified the guar­
anty of territorial rights by defining the term "relinquishment of claims". 
Article VI of the treaty stated:
34Ibid., p. 664.
33Ibid., pp. 669-71.
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. . . but when those tribes, or any of them, shall be dis­
posed to sell their lands, or any part of them, they are to 
be sold only to the United States; and until such sale, the 
United States will protect all the said Indian tribes in the 
quiet enjoyment of their lands against all citizens of the 
United States, and against all other white persons who in­
trude upon the same. And the said Indian tribes again ac­
knowledge themselves to be under the protection of the said 
United States and no other power whatever.
By this definition, relinquishment of tribal lands clearly imposed Fed­
eral control over the property but it also created the basis for com­
plete Federal acquisition against the interest of the tribes. Techni­
cally, the only right guaranteed the Indians was the right of occupancy.
As long as the land was used as a home by the tribes it was available to 
their use in perpetuity; however, once the land was abandoned, title de­
volved to the government and the tribe had no claim to the land.
To compensate the tribe, the United States specifically relinquished 
its claim to "all other Indian lands" with certain exceptions and provided 
payment by a guaranty of goods valued at $20,000 in the first year and 
$9,500 in every following year. However, the boundary lines for the land
ceded and paid for were established in only a general way. Exact surveys
were to be taken after the fact in accordance with the provisions of the
37
treaty and supervised by Indian representatives.
In sum, all treaties contained provisions which acknowledged Fed­
eral ownership of land, Indian occupancy of land, granted some form of
36Ibid., p. 678. 
37Ibid., p. 673.
15
compensation, usually in goods, and stipulated the events which would
38terminate the protected Indian occupancy of the land. However, treaty- 
making was conducted in a highly unstable environment and the 1832 Treaty 
of Paynes’ Landing exemplifies the problems involved. Under its terms, 
a delegation of six members of the Florida Seminoles was chosen to in­
spect land in Arkansas for prospective relocation. Their authority was 
limited to reporting their findings to tribal leaders and not to commit 
the tribe to any agreement. Despite their unfavorable opinion, the repre­
sentatives were pressured into signing an agreement requiring the tribe 
to move to the Arkansas land. The agreement was upheld as part of the
treaty and ratified by the Senate. When the government tried to enforce
39
the terms of the Treaty, war ensued.
The tremendous obstacles of language, understanding, capacity to 
carry out terms, and blatant violations of terms were all elements of 
the treaty process. The result of the system, however, was the acquisi­
tion by the United States of title to all lands within its boundaries and 
the defeat of Indian sovereignty.
^Other treaties included special provisions which recompensed the 
United States for expenses incurred as the result of a war in violation 
of a prior treaty, promised special gifts to the tribes upon information 
leading to discovery of valuable minerals and granted supervisory author­
ity to tribal leaders. See Treaty of Fort Jackson, August 9, 1914, Israel, 
Major Peace Treaties, p. 691; Treaty of Fort Armstrong, September 21, 1832, 
ibid., p. 714.
39Notes, "Systematic Discrimination," p. 1302, n. 31, citing Blumenthal, 
pp. 104-106.
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Philosophical Position of the Supreme Court
The validity of the treaty-making process was dependent on two 
processes— the negotiation and execution of agreements and the separate 
policy and action of Congress. While treaties were constitutionally 
recognized as part of the supreme law of the land, the administration
of Indian relations was granted to the legislature. This dual approach
\
to Indian affairs, treaty-making and legislation, is the major source of 
litigation and, consequently* the major theme of judicial debate.
As the final authority on constitutional and legal questions, the 
Supreme Court has rendered definitions of the status of treaties, tribes, 
and the boundaries of Congressional authority in its management of tri­
bal lands. Notwithstanding the Court's opinions, the treaty process re­
mained a complicated and chameleon-like approach to acquiring title.
While the opinions themselves illustrate the legal questions involved, 
the facts behind each case illustrate the complexities and inherent 
failure of the treaty-making process as a just solution, and its success 
in attaining the goal of Federal ownership and control of property.
The Supreme Court defined the relationship of treaties and statutes 
in Cherokee Tobacco*^ finding that treaties have "no higher sanctity" and 
"are no more obligatory" when made with Indian tribes than in any other 
international relationship,^1 and are therefore subject to Congressional
4078 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1870).
^Price, American Indian, p. 420, citing Cherokee Tobacco.
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invalidation. While thus providing a simple legal standard of valid­
ity, i.e. the most contemporary is valid, the Court did not clarify 
the rea.1 problem of a consistent and just approach to acquisition of 
tribal lands. It was constitutionally prohibited from doing so as its 
function is not legislative in nature. But the effect of the decision 
was to negate a validly executed document which should have been honored 
in all respects.
The case arose from a conflict between Article 10 of the Treaty of 
1866 and Section 107 of the Act of 1868. The Treaty granted the Chero- 
kees the right to sell any product without paying a tax "levied on quan­
tity sold outside of the Indian territory." The Act established a tax on
42
liquor and tobacco produced anywhere within the United States. To re­
concile the conflicting policies, the Court first expressed the unchanging 
nature of the Constitution in the face of both treaty and statute. Neither 
changes the Constitution and both must fall if they violate the Constitu­
tion. Since both treaty and statute, in the case at hand, were valid and 
legal obligations, one or the other had to fall. The Constitution speci­
fically granting authority to Congress, the Act of 1868 superseded the pro­
visions of the Treaty and the Cherokees were subject to taxation.
The consequences in all such cases give rise to questions 
which must be met by the political department of the gov­
ernment. They are beyond the sphere of judicial cognizance.
In the case under consideration the act of Congress must pre­
vail as if the treaty were not an element to be considered. If
42Ibid., p. 421.
18
a wrong has been done the power of redress is with Con­
gress, not with the judiciary . . . .
. . . The burden must rest somewhere.^
Cherokee Tobacco resulted in an acknowledgment that though treaties 
express obligations made in good faith they cannot be depended upon, the 
ability to abrogate any terms being a constitutionally recognized right 
of Congress. However, the standard of good faith was not to be lightly 
violated by state authority.
An 1831 opinion in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia is famous for its ex­
pression of federalist doctrine rejecting casual violation of the terms
44
of federal treaties with tribes. The opinion written by Chief Justice 
John Marshall found that a tribe could not maintain an action in federal 
courts as it was neither a state nor a foreign nation, but that Indians 
are "domestic dependent nations" under the sovereignty of the United 
States. As such, they have an unquestionable right to their land until 
they voluntarily yield their title to the United States.
The case arose out of an attempt by Georgia to remove the Creek and 
Cherokee Indians outside its western boundary. While Federal policy had 
been to gradually purchase all of the tribal lands and include them within
/ ^
Ibid., p. 422, citing the Court’s opinion per Justice Swayne.
^Alfred H. Kelly and Winfred A. Harbison, The American Constitution—  
Its Origins and Development (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1970)» 
p. 301.
45Ibid., p. 303.
19
Georgia’s jurisdiction, the Cherokee Nation adopted a written constitu­
tion in 1827 proclaiming themselves an independent state. Impatient 
for the completion of Federal acquisition and assignment of the land 
and in the face of the Cherokee action, Georgia extended state law over 
the Indian territory, declared all Indian law null and void, and di­
rected the seizure of the lands. Pursuant to Georgia’s laws, the state 
tried, convicted and executed an Indian (Corn Tassel) despite a writ of 
error granted by the Supreme Court after the trial. The Governor of 
Georgia declared absolute resistance to all interference with Georgia’s
courts and since President Jackson refused to act on behalf of the tribe
46an injunction was sought to restrain the state.
Although in the Court’s opinion the tribe had no standing to bring 
a suit before it, it legitimized tribal rights pursuant to.federal trea­
ties and reaffirmed Federal supremacy over state authority. Since the 
case had no legally binding outcome in the absence of valid standing of 
the tribe, the conflict between Georgia and the Cherokee Nation was not 
resolved. In a supplementary decision, the Court was able to render a 
legally binding opinion. In Worcester v. Georgia (1832), Marshall again 
held against the state, finding that the Cherokee nation was a separate 
and distinct political community which could be entered only upon the 
tribe’s consent or "in conformity with treaties and acts of Congress."47 
Federal law, therefore, dominates both Indian and state law.
46Ibid., p. 302. 47Ibid., p. 303.
20
In this instance, Georgia had established a licensing system for 
non-Indians residing on Indian lands, A trader was tried and convicted 
for violation of the system and appealed his conviction. Here, a pri­
vate, non-Indian individual was involved and these facts contributed to 
the clear statement of Federal authority and acknowledgment of Indian 
rights. However, when Marshall implied an executive duty to implement 
the decision, his caution was ignored by both Jackson and Georgia. The 
Cherokee's cause was resolved only when the tribe ceded its lands by an-
L O
other treaty and migrated west of the Mississippi River. °
Having affirmed Congressional authority to make and break treaties, 
and the supremacy of Federal authority in Indian relations, the question 
of the extent of administrative power held by Congress remained. Trea­
ties could be revoked, but could Congressional authority be assigned to 
administrative agencies and how was the language of treaties to be inter­
preted?
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In Cherokee Nation y. Hitchcock the Court found that Congress had 
the power to grant specific authority to administrative agencies in its 
management of Indian relations and that the meaning of terms of treaties 
could be interpreted by the Congress, The case involved consideration of 
two treaties with the Cherokee made in 1835 and 1846, and a Congressional 
statute of 1898 which authorized the Secretary of the Interior to lease
48ibid.
49187 U.S. 294 (1902).
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mineral and oil rights on land granted to the Cherokees pursuant to 
the treaties.
The tribe challenged the statute by alleging that the Treaty of
1835 had granted them a "fee simple interest" in the land in question
and the right, through their governing council, to make and execute
51all necessary laws to regulate the land. Under the Treaty of 1846, how­
ever, the Cherokees were required to make laws for equal protection under
52the law and for the security of life, liberty and property.
The Court’s opinion by Justice White refused to enjoin the Secretary 
of the Interior from pursuing the leasing arrangements. Citing the Report 
of the Senate Committee on the Five Civilized Tribes of Indians, the 
Court accepted the interpretation that the 1846 obligation of the tribe 
to provide for equal protection under the law meant "equitable participa­
tion in the common property of the tribe". It also accepted the doctrine 
of federal responsibility to provide for "equitable participation" in the 
absence of tribal action.
"^Price, American Indian, p. 422.
-^Ibid. "An absolute or fee simple estate is one in which the owner is 
entitled to the entire property, with unconditional power of disposition dur­
ing his life, and descending to his heirs and legal representatives upon his 
death intestate." Henry Campbell Black, M.A., Black’s Law Dictionary (St. 
Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1957).
52Price, American Indian, p. 423.
■^Report of May 7, 1894, Sen, Rep. No. 377, 53rd Cong. 2d sess.
5^Price, American Indian, p. 423, citing Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock.
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The Court then considered the question whether the 1898 Act was a 
valid exercise of Congress’ power and found that since Indian tribes are 
directly subject to the legislative power of the United States and are 
by treaty under Federal authority, no treaty with the Cherokees had 
freed them from dependency on Congress. Congress, therefore, had a le­
gitimate power to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to lease In- 
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dian lands.
The power existing in Congress to administer upon and guard 
the tribal property, and the power being political and,ad­
ministrative in its nature, the manner of its exercise is a 
question within the province of the legislative branch to 
determine, and is not one for the courts.^
Congress may clearly administer tribal lands in any way it sees fit 
and it may interpret the terms of a treaty contrary to the Indian under­
standing of the agreement. While general language can be read with 
ease permitting diverse interpretations, specific language in treaties 
allows little flexibility and sharpens the issues when challenged. The 
Supreme Court has found that even specific terms of agreement with tribes 
can be validly and haphazardly rescinded by Congress.
In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, t h e  Court reaffirmed tribal dependence 
on the Federal government and Congressional authority to manage tribal 
lands even where by treaty tribal lands could not be ceded by further
^^Price, American Indian, p. 424.
"^ I b i d ., p. 425, citing Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock.
57187 U.S. 553 (1903).
treaty unless voted upon and agreed to by a majority of tribal members.
In this case, an 1867 treaty specifically limited the power of an 1892
treaty to convey title, and the Congressional statute in the interme-*
diate years had specifically guaranteed the good faith of the govern-
58ment by virtue by any treaty executed prior to 1871.
By the Treaty of Medicine Lodge of 1867, it was agreed that the 
lands held by the Kiowa and Comanche tribes could not be ceded by fur­
ther treaty unless approved by three-fourths of the adult male Indians 
occupying the land. In 1892, 456 tribal members signed an agreement to 
sell 2.5 million acres of the same land to the Federal government. Dur­
ing the Senate consideration of the treaty in 1899, the Secretary of the 
Interior pointed out that the required three-fourths approval had not been 
met, but the treaty was accepted notwithstanding the 1867 treaty arrange­
ments or the 1871 statute guaranteeing good faith toward pre-1871 treaties.
In an appeal to the Court for an injunction against implementation 
of the cession of land, the Court considered whether the lands held un­
der the 1867 Treaty of Medicine Lodge fell within the protection of the 
Fifth Amendment and consequently within the jurisdiction of the Court.
The Court found that the lands did not have this protection and that, In­
dians being dependents of the Federal government and Indian lands being
“^ Price, American Indian, p. 425, citing Act of March 3, 1871 ending 
treaty making with Indian tribes.
^Price, American Indian, p. 425.
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protected only from state and individual encroachment, Congress had a
plenary right to determine the best means of managing the lands.
When, therefore, treaties were entered into between the 
United States and a tribe of Indians it was never doubted 
that the power to abrogate existed in Congress, and that 
in a contingency such power might be availed of from con­
siderations of governmental policy, particularly if con­
sistent with perfect good faith towards the Indians.^
Although the Act of March 3, 1871 had declared Congressional inten­
tion to honor the terms of treaties, the Court reaffirmed Congress' power
61
to choose the manner in which good faith agreement would be executed.
The sale of lands in open violation of the terms of the Treaty, lacking 
the required consent of tribal members, was defined as "a mere change in 
the form of investment of Indian tribal property, the property of those 
who, as we have held, were in substantial effect the wards of the govern­
ment."
In any event, as Congress possessed full power in the matter,
the judiciary cannot question or inquire into the motives
which prompted the enactment of this legislation [the Treaty
of 1892]. If injury was occasioned, which we do not wish to
be understood as implying, by the use made by Congress of its
power, relief must be sought by an appeal to that body for re-
6 2dress and not to the courts.
^ I b i d . , pp. 426-27, citing Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock.
61Ibid., p. 427.
^Ibid. , p. 428, citing Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock.
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Although in prior decisions the Court had held that ambiguous ex-
63
pressions in treaties should be resolved in favor of the Indians, Lone 
Wolf has the effect of declaring specific protections in the Indians be­
half and limitations on the treaty-making power to be invalid. Where 
Congress chooses to rescind general or specific language, it may do so 
with impunity and good faith negotiation becomes meaningless.
The philosophical position of the Supreme Court affirmed the equal 
status of treaties and statutes, the absence of legal standing of tribes 
without special jurisdictional act of Congress, and tribal right of occu­
pancy against state and individual encroachment. It also affirmed the su­
preme authority of Congress to execute its constitutional responsibility to 
conduct Indian relations in a manner of its choosing without limitation.
The Court's task was an unpleasant job of untangling the web of in­
numerable treaties and statutes, but its standards to dispose of cases 
were clearcut. There is little doubt as to the outcome of any grievance 
against Federal management of property— the United States owned the land 
and had the powers of a landlord over tribal occupancy. The greatest con­
tribution of the Court in these cases was to clearly establish the powers 
of the Federal authority, a contribution essential to the unification of 
the country, but which reflects poorly on the process of "good faith" agree­
ments with the Indian Nation.
Cohen, "Spanish Origin," Legal Conscience, p. 244, no. 39, citing 
Worcester c. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515 (1832); The Kansas Indians, 5 Wall 737 
(1866); Winters v. U.S., 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
CHAPTER II 
THE ACQUISITION OF TITLE TO PROPERTY
InLruduction
The Fifth Amendment requires that private property shall not be 
taken without just compensation. Two of the three substantive factors 
in the Amendment, i.e. the act of taking and just compensation, have 
been the subject of great controversy in the courts. The history of 
the Supreme Court contains numerous examples of the application of due 
process of law to property rights, and here will be examined in appli­
cation to the Indian, who for most of our history has been considered 
a political and cultural' alien and has been managed constitutionally 
under special Congressional powers of foreign relations.
Due process of law, requiring fair procedures, is a constitutional 
protection of property rights. Although the Bill of Rights did not ap­
ply to aliens, the due process requirement of fair procedures can be
considered a limitation on foreign relations since it is applied uni-
1
versally in government structures.
While emphasis is currently placed on exploitation of Indian tribes 
with the implication that land was simply confiscated, a defense can be 
made against the charge on the basis of documented purchase, pursuant 
to valid procedure, i.e. treaty or other agreement, of approximately
^Henkin, Foreign Affairs, p. 255.
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95% of the land acquired by the United States. This defense does not 
exonerate recognized abuses including fraud and coercion; its signifi­
cance lies in the adherence to procedure and compulsory payment in or­
der to legalize such transactions.
This chapter discusses the conceptual framework encompassing ac­
quisition of title against Indian claims, consisting of several factors: 
Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, the Eighteenth Century translation of natural 
law and Puritan ethic into American law, and the Supreme Court’s inter­
pretation of title acquisition,
Anglo-Saxon Jurisprudence
The recognition of Federal title to Indian lands originated in in­
ternational law in the doctrine of discovery and was of primary signifi­
cance in America's English heritage. The period of European exploration 
and colonization required the development of a justification for the 
taking of uncivilized lands and that justification is known as the rule 
of the discoverer. Briefly, discovery of land gives title to the sov­
ereign whose subjects made the discovery. The title is good against all 
other sovereigns though the natives of the land are considered the right­
ful occupants thereof. Their use of the land is uninhibited subject to a 
curtailment of the right to dispose of the land without the approval of 
the sovereign.
^Cohen, "Indian Claims," Legal Conscience, p. 269.
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Chief Justice Catron in State v. Foreman identified the right 
of the discoverer as an accepted principle of international law. While 
perhaps morally questionable as serving ultimate justice, it is never­
theless the law of the land.
Refined sensibility and elevated philanthropy may hold
what it will, the truth is, neither our theory or prac­
tice has ever allowed to the Indians, any political
right extending beyond our pleasure . . . .  Theirs is
not a case of conscience before this court, but a case 
Aof law.
Pursuant to this right of discovery, the United States held exclu­
sive title and could dispose of the land by purchase or conquest at its 
discretion, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy."’ United 
States sovereignty originated with Great Britain which had claimed title 
through John Cabot’s discovery of Newfoundland. The Supreme Court has 
expressed the conclusion that since the United States had acquired all 
rights formerly possessed by Great Britain, it had acquired exclusive 
title to all Indian lands.
An express acknowledgment and explanation of the rule of the dis­
coverer is contained in Johnson v. M ’lntosh^, in which the court limited
316 Tenn. 256 (1835).
^Price, American Indian, pp. 377-78, citing State v. Foreman.
^Johnson v. M ’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543, at 587.
£
Notes, "Systematic Discrimination," p. 1305, citing Johnson v .
M ’ Intosh.
^See n. 5 supra.
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the power of the tribes to grant land owned under valid agreements made
by authoritative representatives of the tribes. Chief Justice Marshall
stated that title to any land depends entirely on the law of the nation
of which the lands are a part. The principle which the United States
operated upon was the right of the discoverer, impairing the rights of
8
the tribes to dispose of land independently.
. . .[D]iscovery gave an exclusive right to extinguish
the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by 
conquest; and gave also a right to such a degree of sov­
ereignty, as the circumstances of the people would al­
low them to exercise.
. . .It is not for the Courts of this country to ques­
tion the validity of this title [obtained by conquest], 
or to sustain one which is incompatible with it.^
Marshall concludes that however morally objectionable it may ap­
pear to deny to the tribes, whose title by occupancy is valid, the right 
to dispose of the land as they see fit, it is an "indispensable" mea­
sure supported by reason and cannot be rejected by the courts. By 
denying to the tribes the right to dispose of their land, Johnson v .
M*Intosh preserved in the Federal government a means of controlling 
white intervention in the affairs of Indians and established federalist 
philosophy in the ascendency by denying to states and individuals the 
right to deal with the Indians.
8Price, American Indian, pp. 360-61.
^lb id., p. 363, citing Johnson v. M T Intosh. 
lOprice, American Indian, p. 366.
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The case arose under two conflicting grants of land made by the 
Illinois and Peankeshaw tribes. The Indians had sold the land to an in­
dividual (Johnson) after which the same land was sold to the United 
States by the Treaty of June 7, 1803. The government then granted the 
land to M ? Intosh in 1818.^ Following the rule of the discoverer, the
defendant who held title by grant from the United States prevailed over
12the plaintiff who derived title from the Indians.
In summary, the United States acquired title to all land by virtue 
of its inheritance of sovereignty from Great Britain. Similarly, lands 
inherited by treaty or conquest from any other sovereign would become 
property of the United States. Tribal inhabitants had the right of occu­
pancy only and were prevented from selling tribal lands without the prior 
approval of the United States. Accordingly, under international law, the 
United States was free to dispose of the property in any way it saw fit, 
regardless of humanitarian motives or treaties.
Natural Law and Puritan Ethic
The influence of morality on the question of acquisition of title 
was contributed by the religious philosophy of the colonists. Although 
the philosophy was not free from challenge, its fundamental perception 
of law as a reflection of divine will influenced official government at­
titudes toward Indian property rights.
■^Cohen, "Original Indian Title," in Legal Conscience, p. 292.
■^Price, American Indian, p. 365.
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The legally acceptable, though sterile attitude of the rule of 
the discoverer was expressed by John Winthrop, leader of the Massachu­
setts Bay colony, who justified taking of Indian property on the basis 
of two principles. First, American land was an "undomesticated void" 
and the Indians owned it only by a natural right. Second, the revealed 
word of God in the Bible ordaining that "man occupy the earth, increase 
and multiply" created a civil right to land, which superseded the natural 
right. In Winthropfs rationale, both natural and civil rights to prop­
erty are God-given; however, occupancy and labor on land convert it 
from common to private property. Private property, a civil right to
13land, takes precedence over the natural right of a primitive society. 
Therefore, colonists had a legal right verified by divine law to claim 
title to lands which they could occupy and work despite claims of tribes.
In December, 1632, Roger Williams challenged Winthrop's reasoning. 
He asserted that since tribes themselves recognized their personal owner­
ship of land until an actual sale was negotiated and compensation paid, 
the land being occupied by tribes until that time, the usurpation of a 
government was not valid on the basis of Winthrop1s definition of civil 
and natural property rights.^
•^ I b i d ., p. 368, citing C. E. Eisenger, The Puritan1s Justification 
for Taking the Land, 84 Essex Institute Historical Collections 131, 135— 
143 (1948).
^ I b i d ., pp. 368-69.
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WinthropTs rebuttal to Williams consisted of an assertion of di­
vine wisdom to which no further challenge could be made:
. . .[I]f God were not pleased with our inheritinge these 
partes, whey did he drive out the natives before us? . . .
[W]hy doth he still make room for us, by diminishinge them 
as we increase? . . . If we had no right to it, and if he 
be pleased to give it us ♦ . . who shall control him or 
his terms?
Despite the religious disagreement, it is significant that the Puri­
tans developed a policy justifying taking of land in terms of a religious
ethic. Their sense of moral integrity was gratified and a pragmatic jus-
16
tification created to attract new settlers to their colonies. In addi­
tion, the factional arguments expressed a need to compensate tribes for 
taking their land and built a foundation for good faith negotiations and 
honorable management of Indian relations 
The Supreme Court on Acquisition of Title
Although the precedent for compensation to tribes was not a legal 
standard, it was supported by government officials and the Supreme Court 
in dicta. Thomas Jefferson identified a limit on the Federal government 
in its Indian relations by specifying that its right to take Indian land 
was strictly limited by the tribe's willingness to sell. Washington's
~^ I b i d ., p . 370.
16Ibid.
17The southern colonies, however, generally justified taking of 
land by denying the humanity of the Indians. Price, American Indian, 
p. 370, citing G. Nash, "The Image of the Indian in the Southern Colonial 
Mind," 14 (unpublished 1971).
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Secretary of War, Henry Knox, whose Department originally managed In­
dian affairs, also recognized the limitation of voluntarism and of ob-
18
ligatory compensation.
On the part of the Supreme Court, while Johnson v. M*Intosh enun­
ciated the principle of the right of the discoverer, Worcester v. Georgia 
in dicta contended that if the line of ownership was traced back to Bri­
tain’s acquisition, it would be found that the land had been purchased 
from the Indians and that no coercion had been present. Therefore, un­
der Worcester, only that property passed to the United States which had 
been purchased by Britain from the Indian tribes. Further, since Britain 
had not had the power of coercion, neither had its descendent in sover­
eignty. Since prior to discovery and purchase by Britain, title had
rested in the Indian tribes, it could be acquired only by voluntary trans- 
19actions.
J
Had the Court held consistently to the extension of the rule of the 
discoverer to include compensation, management of title acquisition 
would have been greatly simplified. However, due to the Congressional 
responsibility in this regard, the Court maintained a two-faced approach 
by also holding to its original position that conquest alone was a valid
1 8Notes, "Systematic Discrimination," p. 1304.
19Price, American Indian, pp. 494-95, citing Worcester v. Georgia,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 483 (1832).
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means of acquiring title. Finally, although in Beecher v. Wetherby
the Court stipulated a line of jurisdiction in acquiring title, i.e.
the Federal government acquires land and states acquire title from the
Federal government, it also stated that it could not consider whether
Congress’ authorization of any means to acquire title was actually valid.
It could not do so because it had no jurisdiction to consider political
questions, and in the opinion of the court, extinguishment of Indian
21title was a political question.
An explanation of the Court’s motivation in relying on the poli­
tical question doctrine was expressed in 1835 by Chief Justice Catron:
[W]e should look well to our powers, and the probability 
of submission to our judgments, lest the authority of 
the judiciary be weakened by successful resistance, . . . .
The Court had grounds to fear rejection of its decisions and consequent
failure of the system of judicial review since it had already dealt with
the stubborn resistance of Georgia and the Presidency in Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia (1831) and Worcester v. Georgia (1832).
The Court therefore offered three standards to provide for valid
acquisition of title: (1) the rule of the discoverer extended to require
compensation, (2) acquisition of title without compensation by conquest,
and (3) the nonjusticiability of the matter as a political question.
2095 U.S. 517 (1877).
^ I b i d . , at 525.
22
Price, American Indian, p. 378, citing State v. Foreman, 16 Tenn. 
256 (1835).
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The philosophy of the Court obviously expressed confusing stan­
dards. Although pursuant to the rule of the discoverer and the contribu­
tion of the Puritan ethic, a generalized attitude toward the conduct 
of Indian relations had been established, only when Congress had assumed 
its responsibility by delineating the methods of management of Indian 
affairs and was challenged in actual operation could the Court clarify 
its position. It is therefore necessary to look further into particular 
cases of a later date which place before the Court justiciable questions 
based on Congressional action.
CHAPTER XII
CONGRESSIONAL MANAGEMENT OF INDIAN RELATIONS 
Introduction
Since Congress was the principal body responsible for the conduct 
of Indian relations, the Federal protection of Indians was accomplished 
largely through legislation. This chapter will discuss the actions of 
Congress in carrying out its responsibility and the resulting questions 
brought before the Supreme Court. The discussion involves consideration 
of the Trade and Intercourse Acts, the end of treaty-making and special 
jurisdictional acts granting the Court the authority to decide cases of 
Indian claims.
The Trade and Intercourse Acts
The first measures taken bv_-Congress attempted to provide an equi­
table system to manage criminal activity between Indians and whites, and 
were intended to enforce and honor treaty stipulations negotiated with 
the Indian tribes. .Collectively referred to as the Trade and Intercourse 
Acts, the six statutes"*” were actually an attempt to control white aggres­
sion against the Indians by equating crimes against any Indian or his 
property with the same crime against a white.^
"^Acts of 1790, 1793, 1796, 1799, 1802 and 1834.
9 •Francis Paul Prucha, American Indian Policy in the Formative Years:
The Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts 1790-1834 (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 190,
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The first Trade and Intercourse Act of July 22, 1790 established
treaty making as the means to conduct Congressional responsibility of
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. The Act stipulated:
Sec. 4. And be it enacted and declared, That no sale of 
lands made by any Indians, or any nation or tribe of In­
dians within the United States, shall be valid to any per­
son or persons, or to any state, whether having the right
of preemption to such lands or not, unless the same shall
be made and duly executed at some public treaty, held un­
der the authority of the United States.^
This statement reflected the Proclamation of the Continental Congress of 
September 22, 1783 prohibiting whites "purchasing or receiving any gift 
or cession of . . . land or claims without the express authority and di­
rections of the United States . . . . and restated the Court's asser­
tion of federal supremacy in treaty making based on Article VI, Section 2 
of the Constitution including treaties in the supreme law of the land.
It is also significant for its underlying assumption that the purpose of
treaties was to effectuate the purchase of lands rather than acquisition 
without compensation.
Having established the basic procedure to be followed, Congress pur­
sued a detailed regulation of contracts between tribes and whites. The .^
■^Francis Paul Prucha, ed. , Documents of United States Indian Policy 
(Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1975), p. 15, citing 
Trade and Intercourse Act, July 22, 1790, U. S. Statutes at Large, 1:137-38.
^Ibid., p. 3, citing Journals of the Continental Congress, 25:602.
38
general provisions of the Trade and In£-e~r-€Q-ur-s-e---A.C-ts establ ished specific
t
fines and licensing requirements for purchase of property and trade with
the Indians. In addition, any purchases were to be reported to the Fed-
eral government under penalty of a f ine one-half of which was given to
the government and the other half to the informer responsible for a con-
viction. Provisions guaranteeing satisfaction for theft had been written
into some treaties and, if the person responsible could not satisfy the
guaranty, the United States government was obligated to do so.^
The 1796 Act introduced a provision requiring the death penalty for
£
anyone murdering an Indian in Indian territory and if this were not pos­
sible, the United States paid the Indian’s family $100 to $200 as compen­
sation.^ If property of an Indian was taken or destroyed, the responsible
party upon conviction was required to reimburse the Indian twice the value 
of the property. Again, if he could not do so, the United States Government
was obligated to pay it provided the Indian and his tribe did not seek per-
8
sonal revenge or satisfaction.
The punishment of Indian crimes against whites followed a specific 
procedure. Whites were to report to agents, the agents applied to the 
tribe for satisfaction and, absent such satisfaction, the President was 
authorized to act. In matters concerning property, a sum could be deducted 
from any annuity due the Indians only if the whites sought no private satis-
^Prucha, Indian Policy, p. 207. 8Ibid., p. 192.
7Ibid., p. 202. -8Ibid,, p. 192.
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faction. Treaties requiring certain payments to tribes could thereby 
by modified by Congress.^
The final Trade and Intercourse Act of June 30, 1834 restated the 
basic provisions of its predecessors. The traditional policy of acquir­
ing Indian lands by treaty was not modified but penalties were increased 
for violation of the property and trade restrictions. In addition, penal­
ties set originally in 1800 to deter British and Spanish incitement of 
the Indians against the United States and forbidding communication with 
tribes with the intent to incite violation of treaties were reinstated,
as was the prohibition against inducment of a foreign nation to incite
11the Indians to revolt.
The indemnification of each race against the other for theft or da­
mage to property was also reinstated in the 1834 Act, having elapsed in 1802,
9Ibid., p. 193.
-^The United States formally recognized the limited sovereignty of 
the Indian tribes in the Act of March 3, 1817 which established Federal 
jurisdiction over Indian offenses but specifically exempted that juris­
diction from intratribal and intertribal disputes and offenses. Prucha, 
Indian Policy, p. 211. However:
"After the Mexican war several treaties abandoned the long- 
established distinction between internal and external affairs, 
and certain internal affairs were declared subject to federal 
control. In the act of March 3, 1885, certain specific crimes 
(notably murder, manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to 
kill, arson, burglury and larsony) were brought under federal 
jurisdiction. Cohen, Federal Indian Law, p. 46, 362-63."
Prucha, Indian Policy, p. 212, n. 46.
11
Prucha, Indian Policy, p. 264, citing U. S. Stat., II, 6-7.
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in hopes of forestalling attempts at private satisfaction. Proponents
of the passage of this provision were motivated by hopes of "patient
submission" of both races to the laws of the Federal government.
When persons are injured by the aggression of Indians, and 
can look confidently to the government for compensation, 
they feel disposed to submit patiently, and to await the 
operation of the laws.-^
No absolute guaranty was made to preserve grants of land to tribes
made by treaty, purchase or other agreement with the United States, but
the 1834 Act restated the prohibition against settlement on or survey of
those lands and increased the penalty for violation of that prohibition.
In addition, whites were prohibited from destroying any game on the lands
except for subsistence at the risk of forfeiture thereof and a fine.
Whites were also fined for grazing livestock on Indian lands without the
tribe's or individual's consent and government agents were authorized to
remove "squatters". In the event the agents were unsuccessful, the Presi-
13
dent could authorize the use of military force to accomplish the removal.
The Act of 1834 introduced one complete reversal of policy. Pre­
viously, the War Department had refrained from interference in intertribal 
disputes. Here the government committed itself to the opposite policy in 
order to protect American citizens and to preserve tribal integrity. Pro­
ponents argued that there was a paternal relationship between the Government
■^Ibid., p. 265, citing proponents of passage of Act of 1834.
• ^ P r u c h a ,  Indian Policy, pp. 263-64.
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and the Indians; therefore, a paternal duty rested with the Government 
to end "ceaseless" and "causeless" Indian wars which were a violation 
of justice and humanitarianism. "It remains for the Government of the 
United States alone to determine when they shall end." In final form, 
the Act granted to the War Department general authority to use military 
force, under Presidential direction, to end or prevent Indian wars.^
The House Committee on Indian Affairs supported the passage of an 
additional bill in 1834 which would establish boundaries for an Indian 
territory west of Arkansas and Missouri to be reserved perpetually for 
the Indian tribes. Under the proposal, a system of government was to 
be established among the Indians, each tribe maintaining its independent 
government for the management of internal affairs and a voluntary tribal 
confederacy being managed by representatives from each tribe forming a 
council. A governor was to be appointed by the President with executive 
veto power, power of reprieve and authority to settle disputes, execute 
the laws and employ military force. The confederation was to be repre­
sented in Congress by one delegate and it was hoped that the territory
■^Prucha, Indian Policy, pp. 266-67. At the time this provision 
was being debated on the floor of Congress, war had broken out between 
the Sacs and Foxes and the Sioux. In response to a plea by William B. 
Astor, President of the American Fur Company, Secretary of War Cass de­
manded the surrender of both sides and their confinement at military 
posts at the risk of the government's taking of hostages or use of mili­
tary force. His actions were based upon treaties made with these tribes. 
Prucha, Indian Policy, p. 276.
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would eventually be admitted to statehood.
Objections to the proposal were chiefly that it was unconstitu­
tional since it granted dictatorial powers to the President and that it 
would have a deleterious effect on treaty-making. In 1834, consideration 
of the bill was postponed. Although reconsidered late in the session, 
it was again postponed and never reconsidered.^
The laws passed in 1834 achieved a reorganization of the Indian 
Department, creating a legal basis of the Indian service, reinstated 
the guidelines for regulating contacts between Indians and whites and 
granted approval to the policy of Indian removal to the West. However, 
they did not guaranty the integrity of lands granted to tribes, maintain­
ing only a shallow pledge of the United States to do s o . ^
In actual effect, the Acts of 1834 changed little. Protection of 
Indian rights remained an ideal largely due to the simultaneous growth 
of the westward movement and a reduction in military forces intended to 
protect the tribes by nearly half, from 10,000 to 6,000. Indian agents, 
though now organized and often effective, had no real power of enforcement.
~^Ibid. , p. 272.
■^The idea had originally been considered in the 1820’s when the 
policy of Indian removal was accepted and had been recommended in trea­
ties made as early as 1778 (Treaties with Cherokees, May 6, 1828; Choc­
taws, September 27, 1830; Creeks, March 24, 1832). The annual report of 
the Secretary of War in 1836 stressed the need for some such system. Al­
though legislation had been previously introduced to the same end in 
1825, 1826 and 1827, it was consistently defeated. Prucha, Indian Policy, 
pp. 270-74.
~^ Ibid. , pp. 273-74,
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Courts and juries were frontier-oriented and strongly prejudiced against
both the Indians and the military who acted as a buffer between the two
groups. The Indian Department was forced to operate under strict budget
limitations, and a consequent reduction in personnel and restriction of 
18
operations. Simultaneously, the government was flooded with claims
against the Indians "on the least provocation and without clear evidence",
and the licensing provisions of the Acts yielded no convictions, effec-
19tively cancelling out the laws.
The effect of these early Acts was to guaranty compensation for
loss of property or life and to make the Federal government ultimately
responsible for payment. The authority of the United States was there-
fore behind ..each.-±.re-aty-.--an.d---statute_p_ur^ Ujanj; _La_i.he custodial function 
of Congress. However, it had become necessary to reinstate the provi­
sions frequently in an effort to organize and control the increasing in­
cidents _of-.crimes_j3ej^ween_JIndians and whites. The success of the treaty-
making system had been intended to be guaranteed by the Acts, but the 
needs of the growing frontier movement for land and free access__tp.— land-
created instead a call for the end of treaty making with the Indian tribes
The End of Treaty Making
In the mid-Nineteenth Century, a subject of great controversy in 
Congress was the apparent ^ failure of the Trade and Intercourse Acts to
^ I b i d ., pp. 275-76,
^ I b i d . , pp. 205-07,
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provide peaceful settlement of the land. Since the Senate maintained
its authority to approve such treaties with the President, Congress' 
opposition to treaty making was not, on the surface at least, based on 
jealousy of its Constitutional grants of responsibility for the manage­
ment of Indian affairs. The fundamental argument made in the House was
that (1) Indians can transfer title only to the United States, (2) treaty
making cannot be used to relinquish land properly belonging to the United
States, and (3) such use of treaty making is inherently capable of trans-
-  . 20 
ferring United States control of lands„.,int-0— Q-t-he^ --h-and-s-:-
Dissatisfaction with the use of treaties for the conduct of Indian 
relations grew in other arenas as well, Indian Commissioner Parker, him­
self an Indian, expressed his support for abolition of treaty making in 
his annual report of 1869.
A treaty involves the idea of a compact between two or more 
sovereign powers, each possessing sufficient authority and 
force to compel a compliance with the obligations incurred.
The Indian tribes of the United States are not sovereign 
nations, capable of making treaties, as none of them have 
an organized government of such inherent strength as would 
secure a faithful obedience of its people in the observance 
of compacts of this character . . . .  [G]reat injury has been 
done by the government in deluding this people into the belief 
of their being independent sovereignties, while they were at 
the same time recognized only as its dependents and wards.
^Prucha, Documents, pp. 115-16, citing House Debate between Con­
gressman Sidney Clarke of Kansas and Clenni W. Scofield of Pennsylvania 
on June 18, 1868.
ibid., pp. 134-35, citing Annual Report of the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs, December 23, 1869 (House Executive Documents no. 1, 41st 
Cong., 2d sess., serial 1414, p. 448).
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In 1871, Congress considered the matter of ending treaty making,
22
In its report on the Organization of the Indian Territory..* the Con­
g ress. xestated its right to determine the status of Indians and the 
nature of any form of government established among them. Second, Con­
gress referred to its authority to manage Indian affairs in any way it 
saw fit, including termination of treaty making. Third, "any system
which does does not encourage [private proprietorship] is bad, and any
~     23~
which actually prohibits it will not long be tolerated." Although
private proprietorship had not been encouraged by laws and treaties (it
had, in fact, been ignored, making numerous inalienable grants of land
to tribes), Congress here specifically rejected the idea that it could
not require allotment of the lands to private persons, stating "Is it to
be wondered at that under these conditions these people make slow advance-
9 /
ment in civilization?"
While the Report acquiesced that previous grants of land were legi­
timate and necessary, it emphasized that land held in common should be
sold for the benefit of the tribes and reminded the government that In-
25
dian title to land was not absolute. The Report concluded in an emo­
tional argument that the tribes will acquire a "magnificent fund" for 
their benefit, that in the absence of legislation ending treaty making
22Report No. 336, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. (1871), 3-4, 8-ll.
23Price, American Indian, pp. 430-31, citing Report No. 336, supra.
24Ibid«, p. 434. 25Ibid.
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"a land monopoly so monstrous" would be maintained and that:
The fundamental idea upon which our cosmopolitan republic 
rests is opposed to the encouragement or perpetuation of 
distinctive national characteristics and sentiments in our
On these grounds, treaty making as a means to conduct Indian af­
fairs was ended on March 3. 1871 bv a simple provision in an appropria-
as independent and capable of contracting with the United States to nego­
tiate treaties. However, treaties made prior to that date would retain__.
their validity and both the United States and the tribes were to be
bound by obligations placed on them pursuant to those agreements.
By the 1880's, Congressional attitudes were commonly accepted by 
the public; tribes were no longer seen as sovereign nations capable of 
treaty making, but as organizations holding a monopoly on vast tracts 
of land who would be benefitted by allotment of lands and instruction 
in the tradition of private proprietorship. Their incorporation into 
the main culture of the country would thereby be assured. The General 
Allotment Act of February 8, 1887 authorized the President to divide 
tribal lands into 160 acre plots and grant them to individual tribal
^ I b i d . Alternatively, the idea of exclusive tribal ownership, 
i.e. land held in common, was well established since each group recog­
nized its own territory, including specific limits essential for the 
preservation of its members’ lives. Cohen, "Indian Claims," Legal 
Conscience, pp. 267-68.
midst.26
tions bill stating that hence£nr^h-~no^Indian tribe wou 1 d^-e— 3^ k-n'Qwle.d-ged.
9 7
Prucha, Documents, p. 136, citing U. S, Statutes at Large, 16:566.
See, however, the discussion of Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, p. 22, supra.
2ftmembers whenever he felt it best for agricultural or grazing purposes,
and was supplemented by the Curtis Act of June 28, 1898, accomplishing
the final allotment of lands which had been exempted from the Dawes Act.
Congress pursued its policy of division and assignment of tribal lands
until 1934 with the passage of the Wheeler-Howard Act, reversing the
29
policy of allotment and encouraging tribal organization. Throughout
the preceding 47 year period, Congress had justified its policy on grounds
of a legal responsibility to ensure that all members of tribes shared as
30equal beneficiaries of the assets of the tribe, and on the grounds that, 
since it was impossible to obtain agreements with the tribes to accomplish 
what was in its best interest, it was the obligation of Congress to do so.
Thus, while Johnson v. M*Intosh provided the constitutional frame­
work for federal control of Indian lands, the Trade and Intercourse Acts, 
Dawes Act and Curtis Act represent the statutory framework by which Indian 
property was controlled and title distributed from the Federal government 
to white settlers.
Special Jurisdictional Acts
Since the general constitutional grant of authority to Congress to
^Price, American Indian, p. 444, citing 25 U.S.C. §331.
^Prucha, Documents, p. 222.
Price, American Indian, pp. 444-45, citing Senate Comm. Report 
No. 377, May 7, 1894, 53d Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. 5.
31Ibid., p. 446, citing Extracts from House Comm. Report, March 1, 
1898, accompanying the Curtis Bill (House Rep. No. 593, 55th Cong. 2d Sess 
Vol. 3).
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deal with Indian tribes was consistently upheld by the Supreme Court, 
no effective means for the registry of Indian claims could be made with­
out the acquiescence of Congress. Although the early Trade and Inter­
course Acts had provided a system for settlement of claims between In­
dians and whites for personal property grievances by lower courts, suits 
by Indians against the United States for violation of the terms of a 
treaty were limited by the Act of March 3, 1863. The Act prohibited 
the consideration of claims arising out of any treaty with foreign na­
tions or Indian tribes and made it necessary for such claimants to ob­
tain special jurisdictional acts for hearing each alleged violation.
Since these jurisdictional acts varied in content, the determination,of
a particular claim depended on judicial interpretation of each specific
- 32 act.
33Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, is an 
example of the Court's dependence on such a special jurisdictional act.
The suit against the United States asserted that title to Indian land 
had been unlawfully cancelled in violation of the Box Elder Treaty grant­
ing the land to the tribe. The jurisdictional act of 1929 authorizing 
hearing of the case specified that a claim which was based only on the 
terms of that treaty could be heard. Since the treaty had not specifically 
recognized the Indian title, the Court could not assume that Indian title
32Price, American Indian, p, 458.
33324 U.S. 335 (1945).
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was valid and therefore rejected the tribe’s claim. In a concurring 
opinion, the Court identified only a moral obligation, not a legal re­
sponsibility, of the United States in this instance.
We can make only a pretense of adjudication of such claims, 
and that only by indulging the most unrealistic and fic­
tional assumptions. Justice Jackson, concurring.
The "unrealistic assumptions" would result from a lack of written evidence
presented by the tribe, the necessity of relying on indirect testimony,
and the inapplicability of a court hearing where legal documents had
34
been executed after conquest.
Echoing the words of Indian Commissioner Parker in his annual re­
port of 1869, Justice Jackson continued:
The most elemental condition of a bargain was not present, 
for there was nothing like equality of bargaining power. . .
Here we are asked to decide whether their [the Indians’] in­
tent was to relinquish titles or make reservations of titles 
or recognition of titles. The Indian parties did not know 
what titles were, had no such concept as that of individual 
land title, and had no sense of property in land . . . Acqui­
sitiveness, which develops a law of real property, is an ac­
complishment only of the ’civilized’.
The treaty was a political document. It was intended to pacify 
the Indians and to let the whites travel in peace a route they----------■------  ■ ■ ■■ ■ - .i i i —  .   ------:- *—
somehow were going to travel anyway. [Emphasis added.]
While the Court’s majority decision denied relief because the jurisdictional 
act granted no grounds for claims on unrecognized title as in the Treaty of
* \ f
Price, American Indian, pp. 459-61.
3 5Ibid., pp. 461-62, citing concurring opinion of Justice Jackson in 
N. W. Shoshone v. U. S.
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July 30, 1863, its opinion also reflected a strong sense that no tri­
bal claims to title were valid. The cession of land by defeat in war 
was sufficient to validate United States title without further agreement. 
Therefore, the responsibility of the Court was to render a simple deci­
sion based on the instructions given by the Congress. Legal claims 
were really not considered, only compliance with Congressional direc­
tives .
A strong dissenting opinion written by Justice Douglas was highly
praised by the general public as reflecting the true spirit of United
States-Indian agreements. His position was based on the premise that
since the jurisdictional act had allowed claims pursuant to the treaty
and since a treaty is a legal document between consenting parties, the
United States was obligated to recognize legitimate title of the Shoshones.
Though the Box Elder Treaty did not specifically state that title was
vested in the tribe, the very act of negotiation presumed a recognition
on the part of the United States that the tribe held title to the land.
It was stated in Worcester v. Georgia . , . that ’The ac­
ceptance of these cessions is an acknowledgment of the 
right of the Cherokees to make or withhold them.’ That is 
good law. It is as applicable here as it was in that early 
case.
O £
Ibid., p. 463, citing dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas in 
N. W. Band of Shoshones v. U. S . Felix Cohen referred to the grounds of 
the Court’s majority opinion as a myth, stating that the absence of tri­
bal identities was a fallacy, and that if nomadic existence cancels title 
those white persons then in possession of the land also had invalid title 
since the land was used only for seasonal grazing. Price, American In- 
dian, p. 464. Also note Price’s description of the events following
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Due to the rigid interpretation of the special jurisdictional act, 
the Shoshone tribe was unable to gain acknowledgment of their ownership 
of the land. Such rigidity, however, fulfilled the instructions of Con­
gress, which had primary authority in Indian relations. Therefore, given 
a favorably worded jurisdictional act from Congress, the Court would have
grounds to accept the Indian position. Such was the case in United States
37v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, an example of the successful use of a spe­
cial jurisdictional act to sue the Federal government. Chief Justice 
Vinson accepted the tribe's position because the jurisdictional act al­
lowed "any and all legal and equitable claims arising under or growing 
out of the original Indian title, claim, or rights in . . . the lands . . .
O O
occupied by the Indian tribes and bands . . . ." The tribe therefore
could obtain compensation because of a violation of their right of occu­
pancy. The Court stipulated that while Congress may extinguish title based
the Court's decision on March 12, 1945:
". . . requests for a rehearing of the case were filed by
the Senate and House Committee on Indian Affairs, the Attor­
ney General of the State of Utah, the Attorney General of 
the State of Idaho, Judge Manley 0. Hudson of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice, the Department of the Inter­
ior, the National Congress of American Indians, and the Ameri­
can Civil Liberties Union. Editorial comment on the opinion, 
uniformly unfavorable, appeared in many periodicals through 
the country. The request for rehearing was denied without 
opinion. The original opinion of the Court was a 5 to 4 deci­
sion from which Justices Roberts, Frankfurther, Douglas and 
Murphy dissented." Ibid., p. 463, n. 1.
37329 U.S. 40 (1946).
38Price, American Indian, p. 465.
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on a right of occupancy, it is under an obligation to pay for the land 
so taken. Justice Black concurred in this decision but pointed out 
that Congress had, by the express terms of the jurisdictional act,
39created a ground for compensation which had not previously existed.
Unlike the Shoshone decision, in Alcea an Indian tribe successfully 
sued the Federal government because the jurisdictional act had speci­
fically mentioned "original Indian title".^
From the end of treaty making in 1871 to the establishment of the 
Indian Claims Commission in 1946, the Supreme Court was severely limited 
by the disposition of Congress. Its reliance on special jurisdictional 
acts had resulted in narrow interpretations of Indian claims, more fre­
quently against the interest of the tribes than in their favor. Between
1881 and 1946, 142 claims were litigated,^ and of those heard by 1940,
/ 0
only 26% had awarded recoveries to Indians.
The determining factor in successful suits against the United States 
was the issue of Indian title to the land, how it was acquired and how it
I
was terminated. The period of use of special jurisdictional acts did pro­
vide an opportunity to resolve the issue. Congressional management of
^^Ibid., pp. 465-66.
^ I n  1951, the Court considered a suit by the Alcea Band for inter­
est due from the time of taking the land on the compensation awarded in 
the 1946 case. The Court denied their petition.
^Price, American Indian, p. 458.
^Cohen, "Indian Claims," in Legal Conscience, pp. 270-71.
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Indian lands was restricted and the following section discusses the ra­
tionale of the Court in doing so.
The Court Against Congress
Several cases exemplify the activities of the Government during 
the years of the final frontier movement. Since Congress had pledged 
the good faith of the United States to honor treaties made before 1871, 
much of the litigation revolved around the negligence of the government 
in violating treaties. While the Court proclaimed that neither Congress 
nor administrative departments could ignore property rights vested by 
treaty,4^ it also proclaimed that property rights were protected even 
in the absence of recognized title by treaty, act of Congress or Execu­
tive Order where Congress had authorized a sale of land to a private com­
pany. The Court had consistently held that lands could be managed only
by the Federal government.
The case at issue, Cramer v. U. S. ,^4 was one of many involving the 
development of a national railway system, an essential element in the settle­
ment of the West. Cramer involved the issue of patents which had been made 
to the Central Pacific Railroad Company under a land grant of July 25, 1866 
authorizing the sale of lands to private individuals. The grant was chal­
lenged on the basis that the lands sold by the railroad had been reserved 
to the Indians. The Court reiterated its fundamental principles in questions
4 ~^Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899),
44261 U.S. 219 (1923).
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of Indian title to and occupancy of land. First, their right of occu­
pancy can only be interferred with by the Federal government; second, 
individual as well as tribal occupancy is protected. Since the terri­
tories involved were required by statute to "disclaim all right and
title to lands ’owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes.’ [emphasis 
45supplied.]" in order to acquire statehood, the Indian lands were still
clearly part of the Federal trust. Finally, Cramer held that denying
individual possessory rights would be contrary to the federal policy of
encouraging settlement and acculturation of the Indian and the patent
was found invalid. Since the suit was based on statutory authority and
not on a constitutional question, the Court could deny Congress the power
46
to terminate Indian title by virtue of the Indian right of occupancy.
In a highly sensitive case in 1925, U. S., as Guardian of Hualapai
Indians v. Santa Fe Pacific Railway, the question arose as to the right
of Congress to authorize an exchange between a railway and the Indian
tribe of lands which had never been ceded to the United States by treaty,
47purchase or conquest. In 1866, Congress passed an act granting the odd- 
numbered sections of land in question to the railway, and authorized the
Cohen, "Original Indian Title," in Legal Conscience, pp. 275-76. 
^ Ibid. , pp. 274-76.
47The Attorney General of the United States had refused to argue the 
case on behalf of the Indians for fear that the results might impose a tre­
mendous liability on the government. In his absence, the case was pleaded 
by the Solicitor for the Department of the Interior. Ibid., p. 278.
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Secretary of the Interior to negotiate an exchange of land between the 
railway and the tribe to facilitate property boundaries. The Secretary 
of the Interior took action to patent one-half of the Hualapai Reserva­
tion in Arizona established in 1883 to the Santa Fe Pacific Railway.
The tribe argued that it had a possessory right to all of the land
based on aboriginal title and that the railway could not "exchange" land
it did not own. The Court’s decision was unanimous in favor of the tribe,
stipulating that occupancy established valid property rights even in the
absence of treaty or statutory support of title and that this right was
enforceable against non-Indian grantees. Had there been a previous land
cession through some agreement to the United States, the exchange of land
48
authorized by Congress would have been valid.
Cramer and Hualapai express the legal position that Indian lands 
are protected by Federal guaranties and that in the absence of a valid, 
overriding statute, such guaranties are absolute. A statute could be 
invalidated if it violated the Federal obligation to protect Indian lands 
from state or individual encroachment.
It is of extreme importance that one remember, however, that although 
tribal lands were protected from invalid Congressional statute and transfer 
to private citizens without prior acquisition through the Federal govern­
ment, the Court still recognized the plenary authority of Congress to
^ T h e  conflict was resolved by the entry of a decree on March 13,
1947 establishing Indian title to 500,000 acres which the Government had 
previously promised to the railroad. Cohen, "Original Indian Title," in 
Legal Conscience, pp. 277-79.
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manage Indian lands and to extinguish title on the basis of Article I,
49
Section 8 of the Constitution. Tribal rights of occupancy were vul­
nerable only to the Federal government and the Court could not inquire 
into its acquisition of title because it remained a political question.
Justice Douglas expressed a harsh, but explicit summary of the 
Court’s position on political questions in Santa Fe Pacific Railway in 
relation to extinguishment of title:
And whether it be done by treaty, by the sword, by pur­
chase, by the exercise of complete domination adverse to 
the right of occupancy or otherwise, its justness is not 
open to inquiry in the c o u r t s . 50
Nevertheless, where Congress had guaranteed the right of occupancy, the 
Court was free to entertain suits.
The whole history of Indian claims, then, revolves around the succes­
sion of treaties and ensuing statutes. In many cases, complex renegotia­
tions with tribes were attempted to achieve the goal of acquisition of 
land and eventual settlement. Two cases will illustrate the results of 
good faith negotiations with the United States by Indian tribes.
In Shoshone Tribe of Indians v. United States, t h e  Court validated 
the action of the United States in acquiring title to land pursuant to three 
treaties with the Shoshone Tribe. In its petition, the tribe alleged that
49U. S. v. Santa Fe Pac. R. R . , at 347.
50price, American Indian, p. 419, citing U. S. v. Santa Fe Pac. R. R., 
at 347.
51299 U.S. 476 (1937),
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the Treaty of July 3, 1868 had been violated. The tribe had agreed by 
that treaty to relinquish a reservation of 44.7 million acres for one 
of 3.1 million acres contingent upon a pledge by the United States that 
no person would ever be allowed to cross over or settle upon the land.
The Commissioner of Indian Affairs, acting with the Secretary of the In­
terior, relocated the Arapahoe tribe on a portion of the 3.1 million acres 
pledged to the Shoshone. While the Shoshones agreed to the temporary pre­
sence of the Arapahoe, no action was taken by the government to locate an 
alternative permanent settlement for the squatters. When the tribe ob­
jected to the situation, an agreement was concluded purchasing another 
portion of the land and stipulating that the new agreement did not deprive 
the Shoshone of annuities or benefits made under prior treaties. The
Agreement was ratified by Congress in 1897; the same procedure was followed
52
in a third agreement of purchase in 1904.
The Supreme Court found that the transactions were valid, but that 
the amount of compensation had been inadequate since the land had been at 
least value at the time of the taking.33 The Court therefore affirmed a 
judgment against the United States in the amount of $4,408,444.23 plus in­
terest as compensation for the lands taken without tribal consent by relo­
cating another tribe thereon.
33Price, American Indian, pp. 451-53.
5 3 Ibid.
"^Cohen, ’’Spanish Origin,” in Legal Conscience, p. 247, n. 51.
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The Court performed honorably in Shoshone by requiring reasonable 
compensation for lands validly taken. However, the allocation of land 
and just payment for them was a difficult question and more often than 
not Congress’ action was validated even where its purpose and methods 
were morally questionable. Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States-^  
is an interesting example of how the government managed tribal lands 
when confronted with the unavoidable intrusion of white settlers. The 
area involved, the Black Hills, had been part of a Sioux reservation by 
an agreement of 1868. However, with the discovery of gold in 1874, the 
"government was faced with a fait accompli which it accepted in violation 
of the treaty [Blumental 128-29]."
Military troops were sent to the area to prevent the incursion of 
fortune hunters with the eventual result of war, but following the failure 
of Custer’s Expedition it became obvious that new agreements, had to be 
negotiated for the purchase of the Indian lands and their subsequent re­
moval ,
In his annual report to Congress in 1875, the Secretary of the In­
terior urged that Congress take action to resolve the crisis in the Black 
Hills resulting from the inability of the government to settle the dis­
putes peacefully. While the Secretary acknowledged that the land was 
held by valid titie in the tribes and that treaties should be generally
5597 Ct. Cl. 613 (1942).
- ^ N o t e s ,  "Systematic Discrimination," p. 1303.
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inviolate, he urged that Congress take action on the basis of the gratui­
tous services provided the tribes by the government. The obligation was 
valued at approximately $1.25 million over a two year period. He con­
cluded :
It is submitted, therefore, under these circumstances, for 
the consideration of Congress, whether it would not be jus­
tifiable and proper to make future appropriations for sup­
plies to this people, contingent on the relinquishment of 
the gold field in the Black Hills and the right-of-way 
thereto.^
In December, 1875, the President recommended similar action and cited the
c Q
opinion of the Secretary in his report.
The resulting legislation of August 15, 1876 accepted the Executive 
recommendation and appropriated an additional sum of $1.0 million per year 
for the subsistence and civilization of the Sioux contingent upon their re­
linquishment of the lands. The President appointed a commission to handle 
the negotiations for the purchase and, although more than 90% of the tri­
bal members rejected the government’s offer (under the Treaty of 1868,
three-fourths assent was required), the agreement was submitted to Congress
59and approved on February 28, 1877.
In finding against the Sioux Tribe, the Court concluded:
Plaintiff’s position in substance is that one party to a pro­
posed transaction cannot legally fix the terms or considera­
tion and force the other party to accept them. This is true
^Price, American Indian, pp. 437-438.
58lbid. 59Ibid., pp. 438-39.
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in transactions between private parties dealing at arm’s 
length and on terms of equal authority, but this legal 
proposition does not follow in dealings between the Gov­
ernment and Indian Tribes so as to enable the Indians
to question in a legal proceeding the policy, wisdom,
or authority of Congress, unless Congress has clearly
granted to the Indians the right to do so,88
An agreement accepted by only 10% of the tribe was thereby accepted 
by the Court as a valid exercise of Congressional authority. The posi­
tion of the Sioux tribe as a whole was not acknowledged; only the action 
of Congress was of significance before the Court.
Conclusion
The activities of Congress in managing Indian relations are the 
ultimate determining element in how and when title to Indian land is trans­
ferred to the United States. Congress has followed a pattern of estab­
lishing methods of title acquisition which would streamline the settle­
ment of the continent and fulfill its obligation to make laws for the wel­
fare of the country. The Trade and Intercourse Acts enunciated federal
supremacy in these matters and guaranteed Federal protection of treaty 
rights against state and individual encroachment. Although attempts 
made to recognize the political equality of Indians by incorporating 
their tribal system into the republican structure had failed, at least 
the precedent for compensation for taking land had been accomplished by 
the Acts.
Price, American Indian, p. 440, citing Sioux Tribe of Indians 
v. United States,
61
Settlement of land was of the utmost concern to Congress and the 
subsequent end of treaty making in 1871 was merely an acknowledgment of 
the fact, Treaties were defined as political documents whose result 
had been to create the ogre of land monopoly and therefore were clearly 
unacceptable means of controlling the Federal domain. With the end of 
treaty making, a new policy of division and allotment of tribal lands 
was instituted to tranquilize the nation’s fear of vast portions of land 
impeding the development of the nation.
Although Congress rejected the sovereignty of tribes, it expressed 
its intention to honor its treaty obligations. To do so, it permitted 
requests for special consideration of claims against the United States.
The exact terminology of the special jurisdictional acts was of great 
importance to the Supreme Court in determining liability, and since 
Congress was responsible for the terminology the Court’s function was 
to dispose of cases according to the intent of Congress. Where, however, 
the language of the acts was general, the Court was able to maintain the 
integrity of treaties and find liability in the government. Nevertheless, 
whatever means Congress used, whether by agreement or by conquest, were 
valid, pursuant to the constitutional grant of authority to the legisla­
tive body for the conduct of Indian relations.
The Court was, however, able to nullify Congressional action which 
violated the general legal principles of Indian relations. Treaty rights 
were vulnerable only to the Federal government and could not be infringed 
by state or individual actions. Attempts to simplify the development of
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a transcontinental railway system exemplified the Courtis adherence to 
this rule even where the national interest was thereby complicated. 
Congress was, therefore, obliged to honor its prior agreements with In­
dians, but, as the Court expressed in Sioux Tribe, even the most trans­
parent infractions of terms of a treaty were valid if approved by Con­
gress .
In sum, Congressional action was supreme and the Court’s role was 
one of balancing treaties against statutes, maintaining only the most 
elemental obligations of the government to the Indian tribes.
CHAPTER XV 
THE INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION
Introduction
Adjudication of Indian property rights had always depended upon 
Congress to provide a means of suing the Federal government. Once the 
period of Indian wars came to an end, and the Trade and Intercourse Acts 
were no longer relevant, special jursidictional acts had provided the 
means to assert claims against the United States. As tribes became educated 
to the standards of American jurisprudence, the number of claims increased 
formidably and Congress sought a means to eliminate the growing demands on 
its time for passage of the special jurisdictional acts. The result of 
the discussion was the passage of the Indian Claims Commission Act of 
August 13, 1946.^
The establishment of the Commission was the logical result of Ameri­
can reliance on the rule of law, a concept inherited from Britain, and an
2
increase in the number of claims brought by Indian plaintiffs. The passage 
of the Act acknowledged that tribes have a legitimate right to reparation 
and that there must be a method of acquiring such reparation. These con­
cepts were new to the theory of compensability of Indian claims, and were
3
regarded not as legal, but as moral obligations of the government.
"^Act of August 13, 1946, ch. 959, 1, 60 Stat. 1049 (Codified at 25 
U.S.C, ch. 2A (1970)).
2
Cohen, "Indian Claims,", in Legal Conscience, p. 268.
3
Notes, "Systematic Discrimination,", p. 1307, citing 90 Cong. Rec.
5314 (.1946),
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This chapter contains a discussion of the new standards for adju­
dication provided by the Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946, and the 
application of the standards in actual practice of the Commission and 
the Court of Claims, the body of appeal from decisions of the Commission. 
Standards
The Commission operates in an adversary manner between the govern­
ment and the Indian tribes and renders decisions based on events arising 
before 1947. Decisions may be appealed to the Court of Claims, which
also has direct jurisdiction for actions based on events arising after 
4
1946. The system is based on the principal that compensation should be
provided for lands unfairly or illegally taken even if full restitution
5can never be made.
Included in the definition of its jurisdiction are claims based 
on fraudulent revisions to agreements with the United States, mutual or 
unilateral mistakes, "unconscionable consideration", and "fair and honor­
able dealings" not recognized by any law or rule. While most of these 
definitions require interpretation of treaties and other legal documents, 
the "fair and honorable dealings" standard is one requiring consideration 
of moral or ethical questions. Its subjective nature has been severely 
limited in practice, but, again, it is a statutory acknowledgment that
^Sandra C. Danforth, "Repaying Historical Debts: The Indian Claims 
Commission," North Dakota Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 2 (Winter, 1973), p. 390.
^Notes, "Systematic Discrimination," p. 1300, citing W. Blumenthal, 
American Indians Dispossessed 22-23 (1955),
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such questions are significant in resolving claim disputes.
The standards of the Indian Claims Commission which expanded the
bases for entry of claims against the United States are, in summary,
the acknowledgment of a moral obligation of the government to provide
reparation for invalid taking of land, any claim arising out of fraud,
"mistakes", unreasonable compensation and the absence of good faith
negotiations which are not recognized by any law or rule.
The 1946 Act also provided additional standards to the court of
appeal. The Court of Claims was granted judicial review to determine
. . . whether the findings of fact of the Commission are
supported by substantial evidence,, in which event they 
shall be conclusive, and also whether the conclusions of
law . . . stated by the Commission as a basis for its final
determination, are valid and supported by the Commissioner's 
findings of fact.^
The Court of Claims will therefore affirm any action of the Commission
it feels was based upon "substantial evidence" supported by reason, and
reverse any decision lacking substantial evidence. The Court is also
free to determine questions of law and may reject the Commission's de-
Q
cision if it is based on a misinterpretation of law.
The "substantial evidence" based on reason rule seems arbitrary 
but considering the age of much of the evidence, which may be based only
^Danforth, "Historical Debts," p. 388. Indeed, the sponsor of 
the Act, Henry Jackson, commented that many claims concern strictly 
moral obligations. Notes, "Systematic Discrimination," p. 1307, citing 
92 Cong.. Rec. 5314 (1946) .
^Notes, "Systematic Discrimination,", p. 1312, citing 25 U,S,C.
§70(s) 1970.
^Notes, "Systematic Discrimination," pp. 1312-13.
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on tribal custom and oral tradition, great flexibility is allowed in its 
interpretation. For example, the inaccuracy and inadequacy of accounts 
of the geography in question frequently must be considered. What ma­
terials have been written were generally compiled by non-Indians and 
may reflect a prejudice to the government's case. The odds against a
claimant successfully overcoming the variables of ancient, oral evidence,
9
geographical discrepancies and prejudicial data are considerable. The 
arbitrary standard of "substantial evidence" is, therefore, a realistic 
standard and, since appeal may be made from decisions of the Court of 
Claims, is subject to review by the Supreme Court,
The Indian Claims Commission Act, by acknowledging the obligatory 
but difficult nature of Indian claims settlements, did provide expanded 
grounds for successful entry of claims against the United States. All 
of the principles previously assumed, e.g. the lack of accurate evidence, 
are clearly translated into the statute. This statement alone greatly 
contributed to the redress of unjust acquisition of land at the expense 
of the Indian.
The greatest contribution of the Commission and the Court of Claims 
has been to provide equitable compensation for the lands illegally taken. 
While the Act requires that the Commission deliver a statement as to whe­
ther there are just grounds for relief and the amount of relief [§19], 
and authorizes appropriation of the amounts [§22] and manner of distribu-
9Ibid,, p, 1311.
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10
tion of amounts, it does not rule out settlement by restoration of
_ 11 property.
Given the strong attachment to land which has remained 
one of the persistent characteristics of Indian societies, 
just compensation would involve return of at least some 
of the land which was taken, not a monetary substitute.^
In a few cases before the Commission, claimants have rejected
monetary awards and insisted upon the return of the land in question.
For example, the Taos Pueblo were awarded Blue Lake, a portion of the
ancestral lands which had great religious significance to them. The
land had been part of a national forest preserve and was returned to
them largely through the efforts of the executive branch of government
which pushed through the necessary legislation. The action was justi-
1 o
fied as a matter of respect for religious principles and does not 
serve as a reliable standard for all recoveries.
Whatever compensation is requested, the Indian Claims Commission 
Act formally established grounds for recovery based on legal and extra- 
legal questions written in generalized terms. The effect was to acknow­
ledge the justiciability of such indefinite causes as fraud, misrepresen­
tation, unfair or dishonorable dealings and unreasonable compensation. 
Such standards are of an arbitrary nature, but under the Act they are 
acknowledged as valid components of the Indian claims problems, in addi­
tion to the written evidence of treaties and statutes.
1(^ See Federal Register, Vol. 41, No. 97-^Tuesday, May 18, 1976, 
p. 20429 for an example.
■^Danforth, ’’Historical Debts,” pp. 390-91.
12i_bJLd.-> P- 392. 13 ibjd . ? pp> 393-94.
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Practice
Although expanded grounds for redress were provided by the Indian 
Claims Commission Act, in actual practice they were somewhat restricted. 
Given the possibility of the tremendous monetary obligations which could 
be enforced against the United States, the Court of Claims and the Su­
preme Court, were cautious in interpreting the statutory terms. In Yakima
14Tribe v. United States, the claimants were unable to overcome the vari­
ables of oral evidence and discrepancies in ancient descriptions of prop­
erty ceded to the United States by treaty. On first hearing, the Commis­
sion acknowledged that it could not accurately determine the boundaries 
under the treaty, and settled upon a boundary line which excluded the 
land claimed by the Indians, thereby denying them compensation. The
Court of Claims on appeal approved the action of the Commission, finding
that its determination was a reasonable s o l u t i o n . A l t h o u g h  the Court 
of Claims acknowledged the thoroughness and reasonableness of the In­
dians' argument, it found that "substantial evidence existed for the 
Commissions finding. [It] had been confronted by an unclear treaty
and Conflicting opinion evidence' and, according to the court, had ar-
16rived at a reasonable conclusion."
14158 Ct. Cl. 672 (1962),
1^177 Ct. Cl. 184, 205 (1966), Confederated Tribes v. United States.
16Notes, "Systematic Discrimination," p. 1315,
Here, then, the substantial evidence rule worked in favor of the 
government rather than the claimants, even though the claimants’ case 
was found to be reasonable and supported by detailed and extensive evi­
dence .
The Indian Claims Commission Act was further restricted by a deci 
sion of the Supreme Court in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States. ^  
Since the Indian Claims Commission Act had allowed claims which were no 
based on any law or rule, redress was available for the taking of lands 
title to which had never been acknowledged by any treaty or statute. 
While tribes had previously been protected in the absence of treaty or 
statute (see previous discussion of Santa Fe Pac. R.R.), the Court in 
Tee-Hit-Ton expressed a different principle by finding that only where 
title had been specifically acknowledged could the tribes obtain com­
pensation for violation of that title. The Fifth Amendment requires 
compensation only for those lands, and to establish a valid claim it 
must be shown that there was some definite intention by Congress to ac­
knowledge Indian title, whether by treaty, statute or other action.
The case arose when the Tee-Hit-Ton tribe sought compensation
for timber which had been sold by the Secretary of Agriculture in 1951
from land claimed by the tribe. The Supreme Court resolved the issue
by restating its principle that Congress is the authoritative body to
18determine the extinguishment of title and compensation due.
^ 3 4 8  U.S. 272 (1955), ^Price, American Indian, p. 470.
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. . . Indian occupancy, not specifically recognized as 
ownership by action authorized by Congress, may be ex­
tinguished by the Government without compensation.^
Under Tee-Hit-Ton, therefore, the fart of occupancy of a tribe on
a specific piece of land in the absence of title recognized by Congress
would not serve as a valid basis for the assertion of a claim against
the United States. However, in subsequent cases before the Court of
Claims tribes could obtain compensation where title was not recognized
by Congress if they were able to prove their "aboriginal" title to the
lands in question. Aboriginal title was defined as "actual, exclusive,
and continuous use and occupancy ’for a long time1 prior to the loss of
their land." 20
Again, the difficulties of proving such ownership by aboriginal
title cannot be ignored, and the substantial evidence rule of the Indian
Claims Commission has been used against the assertion of such a claim.
Aboriginal title to the Iowa Tribe was rejected and compensation denied
21in Iowa Tribe v. United States, where the Court justified the findings
of the Commission denying relief by stating:
Where the evidence . . .  is neither sharp nor decisive, nor 
overwhelmingly one way, the fact-finding tribunal must make 
its own judgments and its choices. We have no option but
■^Ibid., pp. 467-69, citing Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States.
20Notes, "Systematic Discrimination," p. 1315, citing Sac and Fox 
Tribe v. United States, 315 F. 2d 396 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
21no. 3-70 (Ct, Cl.. July 14, 1971).
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to conclude that the evidence on which the Commission
relied for its resolution of the factual questions is
substantial . . . . ^
In contrast to John Marshall’s insistence upon deciding doubtful
23cases in favor of the Indians, the Indian Claims Commission Act's sub­
stantial evidence rule tends to be a more precise standard, but simul­
taneously decreases the chances of successful Indian recoveries. How 
can one present substantial evidence to prove "actual, exclusive and 
continuous use and occupancy" by a particular tribe in the absence of 
written documentation?
Tribes situated to the west of the Great Plains had enjoyed such 
aboriginal title since the incursion of settlers came at the end of the
o /
territorial expansion. In United States v. Northern Paiute Nation, 
aboriginal title was successfully used to acquire compensation for lands 
taken by the United States. The case arose pursuant to a taking in 1860 
of land which contained Virginia City, Nevada and the valuable Comstock 
Lode. When members of the Paiute tribe revenged the kidnapping of two 
of their members by the settlers, the Virginia City miners organized 
an unsuccessful expedition against the tribe and requested the assistance 
of the Army in eventually wiping out the Paiute tribe.
22Notes, "Systematic Discrimination," p. 1316, citing Iowa Tribe 
v. United States.
^Cherokee Nation, Worcester v. Georgia, supra.
24393 F.2d 786 (Ct, Cl, 1968).
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In the Court*s opinion, the tribe had incontestably owned the land 
by virtue of aboriginal title, and the United States had clearly taken 
the land not by virtue of a treaty or statute, but by virtue of the ac­
tion of the U. S. Army, the refusal of Congress to intervene, the estab­
lishment of a Nevada territorial government and judicial structure, and
by the determination of the Supreme Court that the miners were more
25
than trespassers on the land.
In Northern Paiute, therefore, a series of actions without the 
specific intent of Congress to extinguish title amounted to a definite 
intent of Congress to take the land against a valid aboriginal title of 
the tribe. Under the terms of this conflict, the tribe was due compen­
sation.
Conclusion
The Indian Claims Commission Act was an attempt to simplify a 
claims procedure for the benefit of Indians which had become incapable 
of hearing all the claims asserted against the United States without 
special jurisdictional acts. By acknowledging the presence and validity 
of such standards as ethical consideration, and fair and honorable deal­
ings, the Congress added to the legal dimension new and imprecise stan­
dards which were difficult to fulfill but an essential part of United 
States-Indian relations.
^Price, American Indian, pp. 449-50.
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The Court of Claims has narrowed the applicability of such stan­
dards by supporting reasonable decisions of the Commission based on 
substantial evidence. A further challenge to the effectiveness of the 
Commission is the potential conflict of interest which the government 
may find in attempting to preserve its responsibility to the tribes
under the act while increasing its responsibility to manage public re- 
26
sources.
In the absence of extensive written evidence, the general standards
under the Act of "unconscionable consideration" and "fair and honorable"
dealings demand evidence of gross misconduct in the management of Indian 
27affairs. Since the standards are so broad they may result in inconsis­
tent determination. Further, the Act's provision for hearing of claims 
based on moral grounds has become the area of last resort; if a claim 
cannot be supported under the slightly less general standards of "uncon­
scionable consideration" and "fair and honorable dealings", it is not
surprising that the standard of "moral or ethical questions" is rarely
28used and rarely proven.
The Indian Claims Commission Act did, however, contribute to the 
acknowledgment of wrongdoing on the part of the United States. It fur­
ther, and most importantly, extended to the Indian all of the fundamental
26Ibid., pp. 457-58,
27
Denforth, "Historical Debts," pp. 396-96,
2^Ibld«, pp. 396-400.
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principles of American law, providing a court for hearing claims and 
expanding the law to cover the claims. The property rights of Indian 
tribes were thereby accorded the fullest legal standing, no longer re­
quiring the permission of Congress to present specific grievances 
against the United States.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
In the thirty years since the passage of the Indian Claims Commis 
sion Act, Congress has passed legislation which has created an oppor­
tunity for some potentially far-reaching decisions of the Supreme Court 
Although the opinion John Marshall in Worcester v. Georgia that Indian 
tribes were sovereign entities has long since been abandoned with respe 
to their status as political states capable of entering into agreements 
with the United States, their intratribal sovereignty had never been 
impugned. Tribal authority to control its internal affairs was reaf­
firmed by the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.^ The Act accepted the 
1961 report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights which ac­
knowledged the tribal right to self government, stating that "it pre-
o
ceded and was not created by the Federal Government."
The grand exception to tribal government's jurisdiction has been 
its control of property. Although the tribes right to manage property 
which was held in fee simple interest is absolute, lands to which the 
United States held title as trustee could be disposed of in any way 
Congress saw fit, as has been previously discussed. Federal protection
182 Stat. 77, 25 U.S.C. §1302, et seq.
^Michael Smith, "Tribal Sovereignty and the 1968 Indian Bill of 
Rights," Civil Rights Digest (Summer, 1970), p. 9.
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of lands held by tribes in fee simple interest was expressly rejected by
3
the 1953 Termination Act which terminated the legal standing of some 
tribes as "tribes" and which defined the policy of Congress as one in­
tended to:
. . . subject [the Indians] to the same laws and [entitle
them] to the same privileges and responsibilities as are 
applicable to other citizens of the United States . . . . ^
The threat to tribal identity has been modified since the passage
of the Termination Act, both by Executive statements of intent to honor
3
the "balanced relationship" between the government and the tribes and
by action of the Supreme Court. Justice Douglas, writing the opinion in
6Menominee Tribe v. United States, closely scrutinized the Termination 
Act which had dissolved the Menominee’s tribal identity and found that 
the Act had repealed only the effect of statutes on the tribe. Rights 
of the Menominee tribe pursuant to treaties remained untouched by the 
Act; therefore, the Court recognized treaty rights in the absence of ex­
press Congressional repeal.
Treaty rights and tribal identities are protected from infringement. 
However, the protection does not apply where the United States is not the
^House Concurrent Resolution 108, 67 Stat. 132 (1953).
^Daniel H. Israel, "The Reemergence of Tribal Nationalism" (paper 
presented at Institute on Indian Land Development— Oil, Gas, Coal and 
Other Minerals, sponsored by the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation, 
Tucson, Arizona, April 1-2, 1976), p. 5, citing H. Res. 108, 83rd Cong., 
1st Sess. (1953); H. Rept. No. 841; S, Rept. No. 794.
^Israel, "Reemergence,u p. 17. ^391 U.S. 404 (1968).
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trustee of tribal lands. An explicit statement of this exception is 
found in Federal Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation,^ by which 
the Court approved the New York Power Authority’s condemnation through 
the power of eminent domain of 1,000 acres of Tuscarora tribal lands. 
While the Court had guaranteed tribal protection from state and indivi­
dual interference, it found that since the lands were held by the Tus- 
caroras in fee simple interest, they were subject to the actions of
Q
state authority. Any licensee of the United States, therefore, is 
free to extinguish Indian title without prior Congressional approval 
if the land is held in fee simple interest. Tuscarora made a distinc­
tion in the requirement for prior Congressional approval by limiting 
that requirement to the disposition of Indian lands by Indians to others, 
eliminating its application to the activities of Federal licensees.^
The Tuscarora decision elicited a strong dissent from Justices 
Warren, Douglas and Black. Justice Black’s opinion found the distinc­
tion to be ’’artificial, and one which violated statutory rights of the 
tribe merely for the sake of convenience.
7362 U.S. 99 (1960).
g
Price, American Indian, p. 442.
Israel, "Reemergence,” p. 3.
^ U n i t e d  States Supreme Court Digest, Vol, 8, §38, p. 668.
11362 U.S. 99, 142.
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I regret that this Court is to be the governmental 
agency that breaks faith with this dependent people.
Great nations, like great men, should keep their 
word.1
This paper has been a discussion of the elements which make up 
the body of law and legislation relative to Indian property rights.
The ability of the government to keep its word pursuant to innumerable 
treaties has been found inadequate. Under the doctrines of international 
law relating to treaties, as discussed in Chapter I, the United States 
inherited all of its sovereign powers from Britain, including the title 
to property of tribes. Although early documents expressed our good 
faith and guaranteed them possession of their lands until voluntary 
cession to the United States, the Supreme Court found the status of 
treaties to be no higher than that of statutes. Congress could, there­
fore, simply override good faith agreements, and was relatively free 
from judicial interference since such matters were considered by the 
Court to be political questions constitutionally granted to the juris­
diction of the legislative branch.
The establishment of treaty-making as the means of Congressional 
conduct of Indian relations in 1790 produced a series of agreements which 
had as their main contributions the control of trade with tribes and, 
most importantly, the assertion of the Federal government as the ulti­
mate controller of the nation*s property.
■^Price, American Indian, pp. 442-43, citing dissent in Federal 
Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation.
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The Supreme Court supported the role of Congress by assisting in
maintaining the federalist doctrine vis-a-vis its decisions in Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia and Worcester v. Georgia, and validated the ability
s
of Congress to interpret treaties without the consideration of the 
tribes in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock. Congress’ authority, by virtue of 
the philosophical position of the Supreme Court, was plenary.
The contributions made by Great Britain were chiefly the require­
ments of legal systems to manage questions of property rights, and the 
infusion into our culture of Puritan ethics, requiring consideration of 
the morality of governmental actions and the necessity of compensation 
for lands taken. Even so, the Supreme Court maintained its respect for 
the authority of Congress, expressing its acceptance of the rule of the 
discoverer and the efficacy of title acquisition to all land by whatever 
means chosen by Congress.
During the years of the greatest exploration and settlement of the 
continent, Congress executed its obligation by the use of the Trade and 
Intercourse Acts, establishing basic compensatory guidelines for taking 
property. With the end of treaty making in 18.71, an acknowledgment was 
made that treaty making had been or had become a sham based on the unbe­
lievable proposition that Indian tribes were sovereign and capable of 
bargaining with the United States. In the hopes of ending a procedure 
which had resulted in the "monopoly” of lands, Congress assumed a policy 
of division and allotment of tribal lands to incorporate their society
80
into the mainstream of American life. Yet to maintain its position 
of "good faith", it also provided that no claims could be considered 
unless approved by special jurisdictional acts granting authority to 
the Federal courts to consider claims against the United States. Pur­
suant to these acts, the Supreme Court was limited in its consideration 
of questions of law. Specific terminology could result in the denial 
of a claim even if based on a valid treaty; general terminology alone 
gave the Court an opportunity to provide relief to tribes denied ade­
quate compensation for lands illegally taken by the Federal government.
Not until the passage of the Indian Claims Commission Act were the 
courts granted jurisdiction to consider claims based on matters of ethi­
cal conduct. With the expanded scope available for redress of grievances, 
litigation against the United States and demands for return of property 
rather than monetary compensation have become of great significance in 
contemporary law.
Nevertheless, it is apparent that Congress has been the leader in 
incorporation of any legislation and policy toward the American Indian.
The Court has merely followed the guidelines of the legislative branch.
Its decisions have resulted in a seemingly confusing melange of positions 
related to the acquisition of title, when and how Congress may legitimately
acquire property on behalf of the United States, and what rights to com-
%
pensation are possessed by the tribes. The Court has determined that 
where Congress has taken some action which indicates an intent to end
81
the title of an Indian tribe, or has specifically ended title by treaty 
or overriding statute, then the United States has valid title to the 
land. However, where tribes can prove aboriginal title or where Con­
gress has ended its statutory control of lands but not its control pur­
suant to treaties, Indians have title to the land.
In short, the Court may uphold previously granted rights under a 
treaty but the merest indication of some intent by Congress to invali­
date property holdings of a tribe must be upheld as incontestable.
A final example of the relationship between the Congress and the 
Supreme Court will suffice to illustrate the long standing partnership 
of the two bodies in the conduct of Indian relations with the United 
States. In 1974 a case was brought before the Supreme Court by the Oneida
Tribe of New York charging that the United States owed the tribe the ren-
13
tal value of their lands from 1795 to the present. Having discussed numer­
ous other cases in which the Court found the merest indication of Con­
gressional action to extinguish Indian title it is nearly inconceivable 
that the plea of the Oneidas would be accepted.
Pursuant to several treaties concluded between 1780 and 1790, the 
United States had guaranteed tribal ownership of certain lands until they 
were purchased by the United States. Further, the 1790 Intercourse Act 
had stipulated that the lands could not be conveyed to other parties 
without the consent of the United States. However, in 1795, the tribe 
ceded the lands in question to the State of New York without the express 
13The Oneida Indian Nation of New York State v. The County of 
Oneida, New York, 414 U.S. 661.
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approval of the Federal government. Here was an opportunity to reaf­
firm the federalist doctrine rejecting state interference in the con­
duct of Indian relations, but the opportunity was overlooked. The 
tribe contended that the 1795 cession to New York was ineffective be­
cause it had been made without the consent of the United States and, 
therefore, that the tribe's right to ownership of the land had never 
been terminated.
The Supreme Court determined that the case involved a question 
which must be determined; it could not be simply assumed that treaty 
rights had been terminated; and returned the matter to the lower courts 
for determination. The impact of the Court’s ruling was, however, a 
restatement of its fundamental principles in Indian affairs, chiefly 
that the power of Congress is supreme with respect to Indian title to 
lands and that such title can be extinguished only with federal consent.
It appears, therefore, that the Court has contributed little to 
the body of law protecting Indian tribal rights. Although it has on 
occasion chided Congress by insisting that it follow the rules it had 
created, the Court clearly has never seriously challenged the authority 
of Congress to manage Indian property rights in any manner of its choosing.
Although many injustices were done, it is hoped that the historical 
legal tradition of allowing Indian claims against the United States will 
continue to produce the return of just compensation to tribes and an arena 
for hearing grievances caused by the absence of good faith of a sovereign 
nation,
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books
Cohen, Felix S. Handbook of Indian Law. Albuquerque: University of 
New Mexico Press, 1942.
Cohen, Felix S. The Legal Conscience, Selected Papers of Felix S. Cohen. 
Edited by Lucy Kramer Cohen. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1960.
Deloria, Vine, Jr. Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties. New York: 
Delacorte Press, 1974.
Hendry, James McLeod. Treaties and Federal Constitutions. Washington, 
D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1955.
Henkin, Louis. Foreign Affairs and the Constitution. Mineola, New
York: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1972.
Kelly, Alfred H. and Harbison, Winfred A. The American Constitution - 
Its Origins and Development. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 
Inc., 1970.
Israel, Fred L . , ed. Major Peace Treaties of Modern History 1648-1967. 
New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1967.
Price, Monroe E. Law and the American Indian, Readings, Notes and Cases. 
New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1973.
Prucha, Francis Paul. American Indian Policy in the Formative Years:
The Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts 1790-1834. Cambridge, Mas­
sachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1962.
Prucha, Francis Paul, ed. Documents of United States Indian Policy. 
Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1975.
United States Supreme Court Reports Digest. Rochester, New York:
The Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Company, 1970.
83
84
Journals, Law Reviews and Proceedings
Bean, Jerry L. "The Limits of Indian Tribal Sovereignty: The Cornu­
copia of Inherent Powers." North Dakota Law Review. Vol. 49,
No. 2 (Winter, 1973), 303-31.
Danforth, Sandra C. "Repaying Historical Debts: The Indian Claims Com­
mission." North Dakota Law Review. Vol. 49, No, 2 (Winter, 1973).
Federal Register. Vol. 41, No. 97 (May 18, 1976). Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office.
Israel, Daniel H. "The Reemergence of Tribal Nationalism." Paper pre­
sented at Institute on Indian Land Development— Oil, Gas, Coal 
and Other Minerals, Sponsored by the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law 
Foundation, Tucson, Arizona, April 1-2, 1976.
Notes, "Systematic Discrimination in the Indian Claims Commission: The
Burden of Proof in Redressing Historical Wrongs." Iowa Law Review. 
Vol. 57, No. 5 (June, 1972), 1300-1319.
Smith, Michael. "Tribal Sovereignty and the 1968 Indian Bill of Rights." 
Civil Rights Digest. (Summer, 1970), 9-15.
Case Citations
Bacardi Corps of America v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150 (1940)
Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517 (1877)
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831)
Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294 (1902)
Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616 (1870)
Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (1912)
Confederated Tribes v. United States, 177 Ct. Cl. 184 (1966)
Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219 (1923)
DeGeogroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890)
Federal Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1960) 
Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253 (1829)
Fujii v. California, 242 Pac. 2d 617 (1950)
In re Cooper, 143 U.S. 472 (1892)
Iowa Tribe v. United States, no. 3-70 (Ct. Cl. 1971)
Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823.)
Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S, 1 (1899)
The Kansas Indians, 5 Wall. 737 (1866)
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903)
Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S., 404 (1968)
85
Northwestern' Band of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335 (1945)
The Oneida Indian Nation of New York State v. The County of Oneida,,
New York, 414 U.S. 661 (1974)
Sac and Fox Tribe v. United States, 315 F.2d 396 (1963)
Shoshone Tribe of Indians v. United States, 299 U.S. 476 (1937)
Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 97 Ct. Cl. 613 (1942)
State v. Foreman, .16 Tenn. 256 (1835)
Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955)
United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40 (1946)
United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937)
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corporation, 299 U.S. 304 (1936)
United States v. Northern Paiute Nation, 393 F.2d 786 (Ct. Cl. 1968)
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942)
United States v. Ried, 73 F.2d 153 (1934)
United States v. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad, 314 U.S. 339 (1941)
United States v. Thompson, 258 F.2d 257 (1919)
Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dal. 199 (1796)
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908)
Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515 (1832)
Yakima Tribe v. United States, 158 Ct. Cl. 672 (1962)
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)
